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Does Enforcement Reduce
Voluntary Tax Compliance?
Leandra Lederman*
Governments generally use enforcement methods, such as audits and
the imposition of penalties, to deter noncompliance with tax laws.
Although this approach is consistent with most economic modeling of tax
compliance, some scholars caution that enforcement may backfire,
“crowding out” taxpayers’ intrinsic motivations to pay taxes to such an
extent that they reduce their tax payments. This Article analyzes the
existing evidence to determine if this occurs. In fact, field studies suggest
that enforcement tools, such as audits, are very effective deterrents. A few
recent studies have found that audits have a negative effect on the
subsequent tax payments of those found compliant on audit. This outcome,
while perhaps initially surprising, is consistent with the deterrence model;
a favorable outcome after audit may lower that taxpayer’s perceived
likelihood of subsequent audit and the perceived magnitude of
any sanction.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States (U.S.) federal income tax requires taxpayers
to self-report income on a tax return, which provides an
opportunity for cheating.1 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
generally operates from the intuitive perspective that enforcing the
tax laws—by auditing a percentage of taxpayers and imposing
penalties where appropriate—fosters compliance.2 However, a
number of scholars have argued that tax enforcement may “crowd
1. Tax noncompliance includes unintentional mistakes, legal tax avoidance, and
intentional evasion. The Internal Revenue Service distinguishes between filing, reporting,
and payment noncompliance. Understanding the Tax Gap, I.R.S. Fact Sheet FS-2005-14 (Mar.
2005), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/understanding-the-tax-gap. This Article focuses on
tax evasion and generally on intentional underreporting, and thus underpayment, of
taxes due.
2. IRS Audits, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employ
ed/irs-audits (stating that the purpose of audits is to “to verify the reported amount of tax is
correct”) (last updated Aug. 23, 2018). Various things may trigger an audit, including
indicators of noncompliance, audits of related taxpayers, and (less often) random selection.
See id.

624

003.LEDERMAN_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

623

2/17/19 7:43 PM

Does Enforcement Reduce Voluntary Tax Compliance?

out” intrinsic motivations to comply with the tax laws.3 For
example, Benno Torgler has stated, “When monitoring and penalties for noncompliance are intensified, individuals notice that
extrinsic motivation has increased, which . . . crowds out their
intrinsic motivation to comply with taxes.”4 Some of these scholars
argue that enforcement ultimately will have the perverse effect of
reducing voluntary tax compliance.5
Because enforcement resources are scarce, with tax collectors
such as the IRS quite underfunded,6 it would be valuable to know
whether decreasing enforcement could increase tax compliance,
even in particular situations. Accordingly, this Article analyzes the
empirical literature on deterrence and crowding out, in order to
determine if there are contexts in which enforcement may backfire.
As there is some evidence in non-tax contexts that external
motivators may displace internal ones, Part I of the Article
examines that literature so as to gain greater understanding of the

3. See, e.g., Michael Doran, Tax Penalties and Tax Compliance, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 111,
135 (2009) (“[H]arsh tax penalties . . . should not be aimed at taxpayers who respond to taxcompliance norms because the harsh penalties will undercut the norms and crowd out
compliance . . . .”); Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological
Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation, 29 LAW & POL’Y 102, 105 (2007);
Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 338 (2001) (“Material
incentives can also suppress reciprocal cooperation by crowding out moral motivations.”);
Yair Listokin & David M. Schizer, I Like to Pay Taxes: Taxpayer Support for Government Spending
and the Efficiency of the Tax System, 66 TAX L. REV. 179, 203 (2013) (“[A] range of sanctions can
be explored for noncompliance, including not just cash payments, which are the most likely
to crowd out pro-social motivations and may even signal that noncompliance is acceptable
so long as the non-complier pays for the privilege . . . .”).
4. Benno Torgler, Moral Suasion: An Alternative Tax Policy Strategy? Evidence from a
Controlled Field Experiment in Switzerland, 5 ECON. GOV. 235, 236 (2004).
5. See Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102
MICH. L. REV. 71, 83 (2003) (“[E]vidence suggests that when taxpayers are exposed to
information highlighting the penalties for evasion, they respond . . . by contributing less.”);
cf. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Normative and Cognitive Aspects of Tax Compliance: Literature Review
and Recommendations for the IRS Regarding Individual Taxpayers, in 2 NATIONAL TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 138, 151 (“The commoditization of a behavior
crowds out positive normative influences on that behavior. Thus, setting a price or giving an
economic incentive for behavior motivated by social, non-pecuniary motives such as
reciprocity can actually decrease the desired behavior.”).
6. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, The IRS, Politics, and Income Inequality, 150 TAX NOTES
1329, 1330–32 (2016) (showing IRS budget cuts and discussing their impact); General Report
of the Internal Revenue Service Advisory Council, IRS (2014), https://www.irs.gov/tax
-professionals/2014-irsac-general-report (“In IRSAC’s view, the IRS is in the midst of an
existential funding crisis.”).
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crowding-out phenomenon. Part II turns to the tax context,
analyzing the empirical literature on the effects of sanctions on tax
compliance, which generally finds that enforcement techniques,
such as audit threats, increase compliance. Part III focuses on the
extent to which crowding out occurs in the tax-compliance
context, discussing what experimental taxpaying games and field
experiments involving actual taxpayers have shown.
The Article concludes that enforcement generally has a strong,
positive effect on tax compliance and that audits are a very
productive tool for a tax collector such as the IRS. While there is
some evidence that audits may result in reduced tax payments by
self-employed taxpayers who, on audit, are found not to owe
anything, that result is consistent with the deterrence model.
I. CROWDING OUT IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
A basic economic approach suggests that the more you pay for
something the more of it you receive—a price effect.7 Conversely,
penalties should reduce the penalized behavior. Crowding-out
theory predicts the opposite result—paying (or paying more)
for something will reduce the amount received, and penalizing
it will increase it.8 Although the crowding-out prediction is
counterintuitive, scholars have made it in several contexts, as
discussed below.9
Most of the studies testing crowding-out effects involve
rewards rather than sanctions.10 In an economic sense, rewards
and sanctions are variations on the same theme, with a fine or
other sanction simply a negative reward.11 However, they are not

7. See Bruno S. Frey & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical
Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 746, 746 (1997).
8. Marianne Promberger & Theresa M. Marteau, When Do Financial Incentives Reduce
Intrinsic Motivation? Comparing Behaviors Studied in Psychological and Economic Literatures, 32
HEALTH PSYCHOL. 950, 953 (2013) (“The definition of ‘motivation crowding out’ in economic
research includes any effect that is opposite to the relative price effect of standard economic
theory: rewards decreasing behavior levels, and penalties increasing behavior levels.”).
9. See infra Part I.A–B.
10. Tor Helge Holmås et al., Does Monetary Punishment Crowd Out Pro-Social
Motivation? A Natural Experiment on Hospital Length of Stay, 75 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 261,
262 (2010).
11. See Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics and Politics in the Choice of Price
Instruments, 64 STAN. L. REV. 797, 808 (2012) (“Society can use either carrots or sticks

626

003.LEDERMAN_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

623

2/17/19 7:43 PM

Does Enforcement Reduce Voluntary Tax Compliance?

actually identical. That is, a reward transfers wealth in one
direction and a fine in the other.12 In addition, people’s psychological responses to rewards and sanctions are often different.13
Although the tax-enforcement context typically focuses on fines
rather than rewards, it is helpful to start with rewards because that
literature is more developed. First, this Part briefly discusses
rewards. It then turns to sanctions.
A. Rewards
There are three strands of literature outside of tax that are
highly relevant to the hypothesis that rewards can reduce intrinsic
motivation. The first strand of literature involves blood donation,
the second is the psychology literature on intrinsic motivation for
performing tasks, and the third is the economics literature on
“motivation crowding out.” With respect to blood donation,
Richard Titmuss’s 1970 book, The Gift Relationship, argued that
(1) paying for blood donations decreases the donations’ quality
because payment creates incentives for those with infectious
diseases or drug addictions to conceal those conditions and
(2) payment is economically inefficient.14 Titmuss’s inefficiency
argument was that there is more wasted blood and higher
administrative costs when donors are compensated.15

interchangeably to get externality producers to ‘internalize’ the marginal effects of their decisions on others. . . . These are equivalent . . . from the perspective of my single decision . . .
because of opportunity costs.”).
12. See id. at 801 (“Relative to present policy, a carrot transfers wealth from taxpayers
to its recipients, while sticks have the opposite effect.”).
13. Id. at 808–09 (citing JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 269–70 (4th
ed. 2007)).
14. See RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP 246 (1970) (referring to paid
donations as resulting in wasted blood). Titmuss based his blood quality hypothesis on
reports from American doctors to that effect, id. at 112–15, 117–18, contrasting that with the
United Kingdom (U.K.), where virtually all blood donation was voluntary, id. at 89.
15. Id. at 246 (stating that the American system “is five to fifteen times more costly
than the voluntary system in Britain”); see also Claudia Niza et al., Incentivizing Blood
Donation: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis to Test Titmuss’ Hypotheses, 32 HEALTH
PSYCHOL. 941, 941 (2013).
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Titmuss’s assertions were controversial16 and heavily studied
empirically.17 Studies generally found that compensation had no
effect on the quantity of blood donated18 or that payment increased
donation,19 which is a price effect. The principal exception is that
two studies found evidence of a crowding-out effect among female
participants who were offered a small cash reward.20
Independent of Titmuss’s work, a psychology literature developed hypothesizing that rewarding a behavior can undermine
an individual’s intrinsic motivation to continue that behavior once
the reward is removed.21 A classic example involves an experiment
in which nursery school children who were promised and
rewarded with an attractive certificate for drawing with markers in
a first session spent less time drawing and drew less well in a
second, unrewarded session than children who had not received a

16. Niza et al., supra note 15, at 941 (“[Titmuss’s] arguments raised a heated discussion, particularly among economists, with criticism of Titmuss for his narrow view of market
forces and lack of empirical support.”).
17. Several studies used meta-analysis, which allows data from studies on the same
topic to be combined, effectively increasing the sample size. See Judy Cameron et al.,
Pervasive Negative Effects of Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation: The Myth Continues, 24 BEHAV.
ANALYST, Spring 2001, at 1, 5.
18. Id.
19. See Nicola Lacetera et al., Economic Rewards to Motivate Blood Donations, 340 SCI.
MAG. 927, 927 (2013) (“Observational studies that control for confounding factors have
examined 14 incentive items ranging from small coupons to a paid day off work. All were
found to increase blood donations.”); Christian Weidmann et al., Monetary Compensation and
Blood Donor Return: Results of a Donor Survey in Southwest Germany, 41 TRANSFUSION MED. &
HEMOTHERAPY 257, 257–58, 260 (2014) (finding in Southwest Germany that compensation
increased the likelihood a donor would return during the first and second year after the first
donation but had no statistically significant effect in the third year).
20. See Nicola Lacetera & Mario Macis, Do All Material Incentives for Pro-Social Activities
Backfire? The Response to Cash and Non-Cash Incentives for Blood Donations, 31 J. ECON. PSYCHOL.
738, 740 (2010) (“[F]emale donors are almost twice as likely to declare that they would stop
donating or donate less often [when offered cash] compared to male donors; the gender
difference is much smaller for the in-kind payment, however.”); Carl Mellstrom & Magnus
Johannesson, Crowding Out in Blood Donation: Was Titmuss Right?, 6 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N. 845,
847 (2008) (Swedish study finding that a $7 payment reduced the percentage of female
subjects donating blood from 52% to 30%).
21. See Promberger & Marteau, supra note 8, at 950 (citing, as the start of that literature,
Edward L. Deci, Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 18 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 105 (1971)); see also Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation
Crowding Theory, 15 J. ECON. SURVEYS 589, 589 (2001) (“The basic idea that rewards . . . may
crowd out intrinsic motivation emanates from two quite different branches of literature in
the social sciences.”).
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certificate in the first session.22 One way to look at this is that
compensation reframes something that used to be fun as work,
leading the recipient to expect compensation for it in the future.23
The idea that rewards might reduce desirable behavior was
controversial in this context, too.24 A large literature developed that
tested when rewards might have an undesirable effect.25 Competing meta-analyses reached different results with respect to whether
a tangible reward for doing an interesting activity undermined or
increased motivation.26 However, they generally found that a tangible, expected reward given simply for performing a particular
task—of which the certificate given to the children is an example—
had a negative effect on intrinsic motivation.27
In 1997, Bruno Frey, citing the psychology literature, published
an article that launched the economics literature on “motivation
crowding out.”28 In that article, Frey argued:
When a work activity is supported by both high work morale
and external intervention, a ‘psychologically’ unstable situation

22. Mark R. Lepper & David Greene, Undermining Children’s Intrinsic Interest with
Extrinsic Reward: A Test of the “Overjustification” Hypothesis, 28 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 129, 133–34 (1973).
23. DOUGLAS G. MOOK, CLASSIC EXPERIMENTS IN PSYCHOLOGY 172–74 (2004) (in
chapter 28, “Lepper et al. on the Costs of a Reward”).
24. Edward L. Deci et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the Effects
of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 627, 627 (1999) (“Although the
ever-expanding field of research that began with exploration of the effects of extrinsic
rewards on intrinsic motivation has moved in these numerous directions, the original finding
of the undermining of intrinsic motivation by tangible extrinsic rewards has continued to be
the focus of considerable controversy.”).
25. Id. at 627–28 (examining “motivational theories, attributional theories, and
behavioral or cognitive-behavioral theories”).
26. Id. at 631–32 (describing four meta-analyses conducted by 1995); see also Cameron
et al., supra note 17 (2001 meta-analysis). See supra note 17 for a brief description of
meta-analysis.
27. See Cameron et al., supra note 17, at 15–16, 21 (finding small but statistically
significant negative effect both for high-interest tasks and for tangible rewards overall); Judy
Cameron & W. David Pierce, Reinforcement, Reward, and Intrinsic Motivation: A Meta-Analysis,
64 REV. EDUC. RES. 363, 394 (1994) (finding the negative effect only for a tangible, expected
reward given for the act of performing the task); Deci et al., supra note 24, at 631–32 (citing
Rummel and Feinberg (1988); Wiersma (1992); and Tang & Hall (1995), all finding that
rewards generally undermined intrinsic motivation); id. at 644 (finding that performancecontingent rewards have a significantly negative effect on intrinsic motivation but not on
self-reported interest in the task).
28. Bruno S. Frey, On the Relationship Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Work Motivation,
15 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 427, 429 (1997).
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arises. The agent is ‘over motivated’ as she would do the work
even if one (or both) motivations were reduced. A rational actor
responds by reducing that motivation which is under her control,
i.e. she lowers her intrinsic work motivation. Intrinsic motivation
is partially or totally substituted by externally controlled extrinsic
work motivation.29

Frey argued that two conditions are required for motivation
crowding out to occur: (1) the worker must be sufficiently intrinsically motivated at the outset and (2) conditions perceived as
controlling the worker’s behavior must be present.30 Frey further
argued that although rewards can crowd out intrinsic motivation,
particularly where the reward is contingent on performance,
workers “perceive rewards as less restrictive to their selfdetermination than commands, which are felt to intrude directly
into the agents’ realm of self-determination.”31
Harvey James developed a model in which when a reward was
sufficiently large, it overpowered the internal motivation of an
intrinsically motivated individual by becoming so salient as to be
perceived as a control mechanism.32 Frey summarized that
“[e]xternal intervention crowds out intrinsic motivation if the
individuals affected perceive the intervening individuals to be
controlling. . . . External intervention crowds in intrinsic motivation
if the individuals concerned perceive it as supportive (or
informative in a positive way).”33 Other scholars have also found
crowding out of extrinsic motivation in the work context.34 Frey

29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 430 (single quotation marks in the original).
Id. at 431–32.
Id. at 432.
Harvey S. James, Jr., Why Did You Do That? An Economic Examination of the Effect of
Extrinsic Compensation on Intrinsic Motivation and Performance, 26 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 549, 563
(2005) (“If total compensation is too large, then the salience of the extrinsic reward might be
so overwhelming that the agent is rationally compelled to perceive the compensation as a
mechanism of control, thus resulting in MCO [motivation crowding out].”).
33. Bruno Frey, Crowding Out and Crowding In of Intrinsic Preferences, in REFLEXIVE
GOVERNANCE FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS 78 (Eric Brousseau et al. eds., 2012)
(emphasis altered).
34. See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of
Reciprocity, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 159, 168 (2000); Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, Pay Enough or
Don’t Pay at All, 115 Q. J. ECON. 791, 793–94 (2000) (finding that college students got more
questions correct when offered higher pay per correct answer, but students that paid a flat
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and his coauthors have found a negative effect of rewards,
consistent with crowding-out theory, in other contexts, too.35 For
example, offering Swiss residents compensation to have a nuclear
waste repository near them decreased the percentage who were
willing to have the facility there.36
These literatures may be applicable in other contexts, as well.
For example, Marianne Promberger and Theresa M. Marteau
examined the experiments in the psychology and economic
literatures to determine when they might “predict[] financial
incentives to crowd out motivation for health-related behaviors.”37
In so doing, they reported the main findings of the psychology
literature as follows: “Tangible, expected rewards reduce behavior
for interesting tasks (where behavior is initially high). No reduced
persistence in task for previously dull tasks (where little time is
initially spent on task).”38 They also noted that the economics
literature finds that increasing the size of an incentive usually has a
price effect, meaning that a greater reward produces more of the
rewarded activity.39
With respect to tax, at least one scholar has proposed rewarding
tax compliance.40 However, tax authorities generally do not use
rewards for compliance, focusing instead on sanctions for
noncompliance. Some countries use lotteries to foster tax

fee for participating got more questions correct than the students offered the lowest fee per
correct answer).
35. Iris Bohnet et al., More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and
Crowding, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 131, 132 (2001) (paper coauthored with Frey, finding in a
model of contract formation that trust is crowded in with weak enforcement and crowded
out with moderate enforcement).
36. Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, supra note 7, at 749 (finding that 50.8% of those surveyed
agreed when not offered compensation but that only 24.6% agreed once offered
compensation). The significance level is not reported. See id.
37. Promberger & Marteau, supra note 8, at 950.
38. Id. at 951 tbl.1. They also noted that the psychology literature looks at tasks the
subject is intrinsically motivated to do, gives one group a reward for doing the task, and
compares subjects’ persistence at the task after removal of the reward. Id.
39. Id.
40. See Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy, and How
We Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX REV. 155, 220–21 (1996) (discussing the benefits of
reducing tax liability as a reward for disclosing transactions that would be difficult to deter
otherwise); cf. Sarah B. Lawsky, Fairly Random: On Compensating Audited Taxpayers, 41 CONN.
L. REV. 161 (2008) (discussing the possibility of compensating individuals subject to
random audits).
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compliance, but the lottery participants are consumers who send in
their receipts, while the target of the enforcement is merchants.41
There are few studies of what effects rewards would have in the
context of tax compliance, which presumably is not a “high-interest
task.” However, a recent field study in Germany included a
reward intervention.42
The German study, by Dwenger et al., involves a small church
tax. The authors explain that “the church tax is compulsory and
noncompliance represents a violation of tax law, but the church
highlights the good cause and encourages overpayments that are
defined as donations.”43 Moreover, the base for the tax is the
taxpayer’s taxable income as reported to the government, making
compliance easily verifiable, although the law was not enforced
prior to the study.44
Dwenger et al. found that, before their intervention, 20.9% of
the 40,000 Protestant-church-member taxpayers in their sample
had paid at least the full amount of tax due—with 55.5% of those
who paid paying precisely the amount due and the remaining
79.1% evading, with 91.9% of the evaders paying nothing.45
Dwenger et al. then assigned these taxpayers randomly to one of
twelve treatments or the control group.46 Unlike the studies
discussed above, where the reward was offered to 100% of those
eligible, the reward in the church tax study was being entered into

41. See Nirmal Sandhu, A Lottery Lesson from Thailand, TRIB. (India) (May 19, 2003),
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2003/20030519/biz.htm#2 (“The government in Thailand
now offers a handsome prize of $7,000 each week to 11 winners, who scribble their names
on the back of the receipts and send them to the Finance Ministry.”); see also WORLD BANK,
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005: A BETTER INVESTMENT CLIMATE FOR EVERYONE 110
(2005), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2005/Resources/complete_report.pdf
(describing a similar program in China).
42. See Nadja Dwenger et al., Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivations for Tax Compliance:
Evidence from a Field Experiment in Germany, 8 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 203, 205 (2016).
43. Id. at 204. Most adults do not regularly attend church but remain members. Id. at
207 (“[B]etween 0.8% and 8.8% of eligible church members regularly attend church services
in our sample parishes.”). Adults can avoid tax liability by leaving the church. See Justin
Huggler, Compulsory Income Tax on Christians Drives Germans Away from Protestant and
Catholic Churches, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world
news/europe/germany/11380968/Compulsory-income-tax-on-Christians-drives-Germans
-away-from-Protestant-and-Catholic-churches.html.
44. Dwenger et al., supra note 42, at 204.
45. Id. at 216.
46. Id. at 205.
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a lottery for a monetary prize, a small probability of being
recognized in a local newspaper for tax compliance, or both.47
Dwenger et al. found that the prospect of a reward or recognition
had no significant effect on donors’ likelihood of donating but did
significantly positively affect the likelihood that they increase their
donation.48 However, the reward/recognition intervention had a
negative effect on baseline evaders, who statistically significantly
both (1) increased their likelihood of evading (by 1.27%) and
(2) reduced the likelihood they increase the amount paid (by
nearly 16%).49
B. Punishment
Turning to sanctions, which are much more widely used than
rewards in the tax context, an argument that Bruno Frey has
advanced in several articles is that deterrence can crowd out “tax
morale”—the intrinsic motivation to comply50—as discussed
further below.51 For example Frey argues:
To some extent, paying one’s taxes is a “quasi-voluntary”
act attributable to an intrinsic motivation to contribute to the
burden of taxation. . . . An unfair, inconsiderate way of treating
taxpayers—punishing honest taxpayers by error—tends to
undermine this tax morale. The net effect of using punishment in
an effort to establish legal behavior is counterproductive if the

47. Id. at 213 (“For all these compliance rewards, the probability of winning the reward
is close to zero . . . ; for the monetary reward treatment the notification makes explicit that
the probability of winning is 1/1,000.”).
48. Id. at 227. There was a 48.34% probability of an increased donation, which was
statistically significant at p < 0.10. See id. at 221 tbl.2 (reporting coefficients and robust
standard errors). P-value is the likelihood a finding is by chance, with p < 0.10 denoting a
likelihood under 10%. See Jonathan J. Darrow, Pharmaceutical Efficacy: The Illusory Legal
Standard, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2073, 2113 (2013). “By convention, a p-value calculated to
be 5% or less (p=0.05) is considered to be ‘statistically significant,’ but other p-values could
also be used.” Id. (footnote omitted).
49. See Dwenger et al., supra note 42, 227. These were statistically significant at p < 0.10
and p < 0.05, respectively. See id. at 221 tbl.2.
50. Bruno S. Frey, Deterrence and Tax Morale in the European Union, 11 EUR. REV. 385,
391 (2003).
51. See infra Part II.A.
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relative price effect of the punishment is smaller than the
crowding-out effect.52

Thus, it is important to examine the extent to which punishment
may have the perverse effect of increasing noncompliant behavior.
There are several studies examining this possibility in non-tax
contexts. For example, a laboratory study by Ernst Fehr and Simon
Gächter found a crowding-out effect of fines in a work context,
where an “employer” could offer a “worker” a “wage” and “effort
level.”53 In the study, the employer could impose a fine if he or she
found the worker shirking; the worker faced a one-third chance that
effort-level would be checked.54 The study found that except at low
“rent” levels (defined as wages minus the cost of the worker’s
effort), the fine treatment reduced effort levels compared to the
baseline (no-fine) control—a crowding-out effect.55
Perhaps the most well-known field experiment finding that
sanctions increase undesired behavior56 is “A Fine Is a Price,” by
Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, involving a study of Israeli daycare centers. 57 The authors had the day-care centers introduce a
fine of ten New Israeli Shekels (NIS) per child for each instance
where a parent was ten or more minutes late picking up a child.58

52. Bruno S. Frey, Punishment—and Beyond, 5 CONTEMP. ECON. 90, 92 (2011)
(citation omitted).
53. Fehr & Gächter, supra note 34, at 168, 170–71.
54. Id. at 170.
55. Id. at 170–71. The statistical significance is not reported there. See id. In addition,
the article does not explore whether the result is driven by workers who were not themselves
sanctioned, workers who were, or both. This remains unclear in a related, unpublished
article. See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Do Incentive Contracts Crowd Out Voluntary
Cooperation? 12–17 & tbl.3 (Univ. of S. Cal. Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Org., Research Paper No.
C01-3, Feb. 2001), https://ssrn.com/abstract=229047. Studies in the tax context suggest that
experiencing the sanction may affect behavior. See infra Part III. Subsequent experiments by
Fehr & Gächter “indicate that a significant part of the undermining effect is due to the
negative framing of the explicit incentive.” Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Do Incentive
Contracts Undermine Voluntary Cooperation? 1 (Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Univ. of
Zurich, Working Paper No. 34, Apr. 2002).
56. See Ariel Rubinstein, Discussion of “Behavioral Economics,” in 3 A DVANCES IN
ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS: THEORY AND A PPLICATIONS, NINTH WORLD CONGRESS 250
(Richard Blunell et al. eds., 2006) (“The behavioral economics literature has wholeheartedly
adopted the paper.”).
57. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000).
58. Based on the authors’ conversion of NIS 1400 to $380, see infra text accompanying
note 71, NIS 10 would be approximately $2.71.

634

003.LEDERMAN_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

623

2/17/19 7:43 PM

Does Enforcement Reduce Voluntary Tax Compliance?

The fine was due at the end of the month, with the parents’ regular
bill. 59 The study found that the lateness incidence not only
increased,60 the increased frequency of lateness persisted after the
fine was removed.61
Uri Gneezy, Stephan Meier, and Pedro Rey-Biel later explained
the result:
One interpretation of this result is information: the parents did not
initially know how important it was to arrive on time. The
contract specified that they should pick their children up on time
but failed to specify the penalty if they did not. The distribution
of the parents’ beliefs regarding how bad it was to be late may
have included bad scenarios (for example, “the teacher will make
my child suffer”). Once a small fine was imposed, the contract was
complete in that being late was priced. The relatively small fine
signaled to parents that arriving late was not that important. This
new piece of information—that it was not so bad to be late—did
not disappear once the fine was removed.62

Ariel Rubinstein critiqued the day-care center study63 because
his experience in Israel—that rules are rarely enforced and lateness
is easily excused—made it difficult for him to believe that the

59. Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 57, at 5 (“Payment was made to the principal of
the day-care center at the end of the month. Since monthly payments are made to the owner
during the year, the fines were added to those amounts.”).
60. Id. at 3, 7 fig.1. The authors contrasted blocks of four weeks each. They found no
time trend in the control group, but the difference between Block 1 (before the fine was
introduced in the treatment group) and each of the other fine-condition blocks was
significant at p < 0.001. See id. at 17 app. B.
61. Id. at 3, 8. The authors apparently did not examine whether parents who were late
in a particular week had been fined in the previous week (or at all). See Uri Gneezy & Aldo
Rustichini, The Second Day-Care Center Study (2005), http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/papers
/WC05/GR1.pdf (explaining that the study reflected “only the average data per daycare per
week,” not “individual parent data”).
62. Gneezy et al., When and Why Incentives (Don’t) Work to Modify Behavior, 25 J. ECON.
PERSP. 191, 194 (2011) (emphasis added). Of course, schools have limited legitimate means to
make children suffer (and for good reason). However, they are not obligated to reward
children who are picked up late. A friend who taught at a K–12 school said that to deter
parental lateness, the teachers would have the children ready on time, sitting and waiting in
their coats. That way, a late parent would experience a bored child.
63. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, Reply to Ariel Rubinstein’s Critique of “A Fine Is a
Price” (2005), http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/papers/WC05/GR.pdf (responding to discussant remarks at the World Congress of the Econometric Society); Rubinstein, supra note 56
(published proceedings of that World Congress).
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procedures the study reported were actually followed.64 Rubinstein
observed that the authors did not verify the reports of the research
assistant who asked the assistant teacher each week who had been
late the previous week. Rubinstein also stated that he was not
permitted to talk to the teachers. He adds that one of the coauthors
of the day-care center article “agreed that he should delay
publication until a new experiment with better monitoring of data
collection is conducted. Eventually, the paper was published
as is.”65
Gneezy and Rustichini responded to Rubinstein that (1) they
did not create the fine of NIS 10, the day-care centers’ central
organization provided that option; (2) it is common practice for
managers in the day-care centers to record which parents were late;
and (3) neither the managers nor the research assistants knew the
authors’ hypothesis. They also stated that they offered to allow
Rubinstein to participate in a follow-up study, but he declined.66
Gneezy and Rustichini did release a follow-up paper, and it
reports the same general results.67 “The Second Day-Care Center
Study” is dated September 2005, but it appears preliminary; it
contains three pages and concludes by stating that “[a] more
detailed analysis of the data and the result is in preparation.”68 This
paper states that the authors received approval from the managers
of the day-care centers for Rubinstein to call them. However,
Rubinstein states, “Although the authors report that they are still
working on the data and that they have asked the teachers for
permission to be interviewed by me, the author who directed the

64. Rubinstein, supra note 56, at 250. He also found it “impossible . . . to imagine that
Israeli teachers would have kept even roughly accurate records of late arrivals” in the bustle
of pick-up. Id.
65. Id. Gneezy and Rustichini explained that Rubinstein “advised us to withdraw the
paper from the Journal of Legal Studies before the publication. Since we were fully convinced
that the design, the method, the data collection and the result were sound . . . , we eventually
declined to follow his advice.” Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 63.
66. Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 63.
67. See Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 61, at 3. The results are statistically significant
at p < 0.00001. Id.
68. See id. Although the study states that “in the new study we also collected the
individual parent data,” disaggregated results are not reported.
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experiment has just informed me that he has lost the names of the
kindergarten teachers who participated in the experiment.”69
If we assume that Gneezy and Rustichini’s data are accurate
despite Rubinstein’s critiques, what do their results show? First, it
is important to observe that the NIS 10 fine in the day-care center
was very low.70 Gneezy and Rustichini reported that babysitters
earned NIS 15 to 20 per hour and the monthly per-child day-care
fee was NIS 1400 (approximately $380).71 Thus, the fine was only
half to two-thirds of an hour of babysitter care, and without having
to arrange for a babysitter. Second, other factors that may be
relevant to the ability to generalize from this study include the fact
that the study involves individuals and not firms; the fine applied
in every instance of wrongdoing;72 the specific context of the study,
involving parental lateness in picking up children from day care;
and even local culture.73
We also do not know whether a particular subgroup of parents
is driving this result. That is, did all parents react similarly to the

69. Rubinstein, supra note 56, at 251.
70. See Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax

Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1461 n.38 (2003) (noting how low the fine was); Stephan
Meier & Matthew Stephenson, When Do Monetary Incentives Backfire?, HARV. ECON. REV.
(Apr. 13, 2016), http://harvardecon.org/?p=3283 (“The evidence from the daycare (and
elsewhere) showed that incentives did not always work as intended. Of course, if the
incentives are large enough they likely will . . . .”).
Lin and Yang developed a theoretical model to explain Gneezy and Rustichini’s results.
See Chung-cheng Lin & C.C. Yang, Fine Enough or Don’t Fine at All, 59 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG.
195 (2006). In their model, there is a social norm of being on time rather than late. Id. at 197.
Once a fine is introduced, the psychological cost of violating the social norm decreases,
reducing the effectiveness of the social norm. In addition, because the psychological cost of
lateness is affected by how many other parents are late, there is a “bandwagon effect” that
further increases the number of parents arriving late. Id. at 205. This results in a new norm
that makes lateness more acceptable, such that when the fine is removed, parental lateness
does not return to the pre-fine level. Id. at 206. Lin and Yang’s model therefore counsels
setting any fines used high enough to be effective.
71. Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 57, at 4–5.
72. See Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 67, at 1 (“One of the coauthors interviewed
some parents at random and was told that the fine was indeed collected at the end of
the month.”).
73. Barak Ariel found that deterrence letters had no effect on Israeli corporate
taxpayers, and moral suasion letters actually increased their noncompliance. See Barak Ariel,
Deterrence and Moral Persuasion Effects on Corporate Tax Compliance: Findings from a Randomized
Controlled Trial, 50 AM. J. CRIM. 27, 41–45, 58 (2012). Other studies have found audit threat
letters to increase tax payments, see infra Part II.B.1, and that moral suasion letters have no
effect or a slight positive one, see infra note 163.
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imposition of the fine, or did those who were actually fined (or not
fined) increase the frequency of their lateness? In other words, how
did the effects on those experiencing an enforcement action differ
from regime-level effects? In the original study, Gneezy and
Rustichini “had only the average data per daycare per week,”74
which would preclude that analysis. In “The Second Day-Care
Center Study,” they “collected the individual parent data,”75 but
they do not report separate results for parents who were fined from
those who were not fined (or not fined for a while).76
Given both Rubinstein’s critique and the lack of detail in “The
Second Day-Care Center Study,” a logical next question is whether
Gneezy and Rustichini’s result exists in other contexts. There are
few comparable studies. However, a 2010 study in Norway took
advantage of a natural experiment in another lateness context, socalled “bed blocking.” That study examined whether fines imposed
by hospitals on the owners of long-term care facilities (municipalities) for not having a bed available for a hospital patient
transferring to long-term care affect the likelihood patients over age
sixty-seven will stay in the hospital after their planned discharge
date.77 Hospitals can impose these fines on the long-term care
facility’s owners if the patient is in the hospital ten days after the
hospital’s stated discharge date (seven days in Oslo).78
74. Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 67, at 1.
75. Id.
76. In “The Second Day-Care Center Study,” the authors distinguish between “three

periods, a first of four weeks, a second of 11 weeks (from the 5th to the 15th) and a final third
period, weeks 16th to 18th.” Id. They introduced the fine at the beginning of the fourth
week—part way through the first period—and removed it at the beginning of the sixteenth
week. Id. They report that “[i]n the centers where fines were introduced, the increase in the
number of delays is higher in the families with higher delays in the first period.” Id. This
could be a function of a lateness-prone effect, see infra note 95 and accompanying text, or it
could suggest that those fined responded with greater delays. However, without more
details, it is impossible to know, as the first period includes three weeks without fines and
one week after fining began.
It is also unclear if any of the ten day-care centers studied (six treated and four control,
Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 67, at 1) had been treated with the fine condition in the
previous study and, if so, whether some of the same parents were still using that center.
77. Holmås et al., supra note 10, at 262, 263 (“[W]e . . . restrict our sample to individuals
older than 67 who are discharged from hospital to a long-term care institution. For these
patients, it is quite clear that the hospital [length of stay] is directly influenced by the
municipalities since they cannot be discharged from the hospital before an institution
accepts . . . them.”).
78. Id. at 262.
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The study examined two large hospitals, one that used fines
and one that did not. A “natural experiment took place in 2004,
where parts of Hospital F’s [the Fine hospital’s] catchment area
were transferred [by the government] to Hospital NF [the No-Fine
hospital], while parts of Hospital NF’s catchment area were
transferred to Hospital F.”79 Thus, some municipalities stayed in
the fine (or no-fine) area before and after 2004, and some moved
from fine to no-fine status (or the reverse) in 2004.80
The study’s results were consistent with crowding-out theory:
“Patients living in municipalities that change[d] hospital[s] from F
to NF stay[ed] approximately 2.3 days shorter at hospital after their
potential discharge date, while patients changing from NF to F
stay[ed] close to 3 days longer.”81 They found that the effects were
symmetric: delays increased when the fine was introduced and
decreased when the fine was removed (unlike in the day-care
center study).82 They also explained that “the daily penalty rate [of
1600 Norwegian Krone (NOK)/day; 2000 in Oslo83] is . . . well
below the estimated average daily operation cost of 7[000]–8[]000
NOK in Norwegian hospitals and can therefore be characterised as
a relatively small fine.”84
Thus, these field experiments suggest that a low fine may be
viewed as a (favorable) price, such that, at least in the context of
lateness, the fined behavior actually increases. A low fine may also
signal that the fined behavior is not so bad.85 Yet a low price may

79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id. at 262–63.
Id. at 265. This was statistically significant at p < 0.01. Id. at 265 tbl.5.
Id. at 266. They note that “in the daycare study it was the same agents (parents)
that had the fine introduced and then subsequently removed, while in our study some agents
had the fine introduced while others had the fine removed.” Id. It is unclear whether length
of delay changed immediately after the fine was introduced/removed, or not until the
hospitals actually experienced the change. See generally id.
83. At the October 2018 exchange rate of 1 NOK = $0.12 (rounded to the nearest cent),
1600 NOK is $192.00. See XE Currency Converter, XE, http://www.xe.com/currencyconvert
er/convert/?Amount= 1&From= NOK&To=USD (last visited Oct. 18, 2018).
84. Holmås et al., supra note 10, at 266 (citation omitted).
85. Some U.S. day-care centers report using late fees that increase as lateness rises
(such as $1 per minute per child) and/or increase with repeated lateness. See Please Give Me
Your Late Pick Up Policy, DAYCARE.COM, http://www.daycare.com/forum/archive/index.
php/t-21692.html (Daycare.com Forum > Main Category > Daycare Center and Family
Home Forum > Please Give Me Your Late Pick Up Policy) (last visited Oct. 18, 2018).
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not necessarily increase undesired behavior in all contexts. Lior
Strahilevitz’s article on the commodification of California carpool
lanes presents an interesting example. San Diego was having a
problem with traffic congestion.86 HOV (high-occupancy vehicle)
lanes were not incentivizing carpooling enough.87 In addition,
approximately 15% of drivers using the HOV lanes were solo
drivers violating the law and risking a $271 fine.88
San Diego then instituted an “ExpressPass” option that allowed
solo drivers to pay a small amount89 to use the HOV lanes (renamed
HOT lanes—presumably meaning “High Occupancy Toll”90). It
also increased patrolling for violators from once a month to three
times per week.91 The changes had two effects, both positive:
unauthorized use of the special lanes decreased92 and carpooling increased.93
This outcome is not necessarily inconsistent with the negative
results small fines had in other studies because, unlike in the other
studies, the baseline included a large fine for violations ($271 in
1996 dollars, equivalent to $433 in 201894). The main intervention
was the addition of a comparatively small per-use price, although
patrolling also increased—akin to increasing the audit rate.95 The
86. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms:
Commodifying California’s Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1250 (2000).
87. Id. (“Although a vehicle needed only two occupants in order to constitute a
carpool, the HOV lanes tended to be underutilized.” (footnotes omitted)).
88. Id. at 1256; see also id. at 1257 n.141.
89. A toll amount is displayed at the entrance to the HOT lanes, and it rises with the
volume of traffic in the HOT lanes. Tolls averaged $1.95 to $2.26 in 1998. Id. at 1251 & n.111.
In 2000, the tolls ranged from $0.50 to $8.00 per trip but only exceeded $4.00 in the event of
extreme congestion. Id. at 1252 n.111.
90. Id. at 1251 n.108.
91. Id. at 1257 n.143.
92. Id. at 1256 (reporting that HOV violations decreased from about 15% of drivers in
the HOV lanes to approximately 3% of drivers in the HOT lanes).
93. Id. at 1234. Data suggested that “the new carpools consisted mostly of drivers who
had neither used an ExpressPass nor participated in a carpool during the previous year.” Id.
at 1256. It is not clear from the article what percentage of these drivers had previously
been fined.
94. Inflation Calculator, SMART ASSET, https://smartasset.com/investing/inflation-cal
culator#uEsf3XMVYx (last visited Oct. 18, 2018).
95. Strahilevitz argues that the increased patrolling does not explain the entire
increase in compliance. He states that compliance did not fully correspond to enforcement
because there was at least one month of relatively low enforcement/high compliance and
one of high enforcement/lower compliance. Strahilevitz, supra note 86, at 1258–59. However,
drivers cannot perfectly observe enforcement, and they may also respond with a lag, such as
by increasing compliance the month after they perceive a “crackdown.”
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intervention increased traffic in the special lanes, perhaps
analogous to the increased instances of lateness once the Israeli
day-care centers imposed a small fine, although, in the HOT lanes
context, the increase was desired. The HOT lanes also increased
carpooling, which would be analogous in the day-care center study
to a small minority of parents increasing their commitment to being
on time, so as to avoid paying the fine.
This raises the question of whether the increased instances of
lateness once the day-care centers imposed fines were by many
different parents (generally supporting a change in the lateness
norms) or instead were by a “lateness-prone” subgroup, which
would suggest that some parents might—like San Diego
carpoolers—feel that their responsible behavior was now
quantifiable in money savings. And, in fact, Gneezy and Rustichini
report in their second study:
[F]amilies who are more likely to be late in the first period are also
more likely to be late in the second and third: this is true in the
non fined centers as well. In the centers where fines were
introduced, the increase in the number of delays is higher in the
families with higher delays in the first period.96

Thus, results reported in “The Second Day-Care Center Study”
support the notion that a subgroup of people—here, those prone to
be late—drive much of the result.
Nonetheless, it is hard to draw firm conclusions from so few
studies. That is not only because of the questions Rubinstein has
raised about the Israeli day-care center study,97 but also because
“one must recognize that many novel and surprising experimental
results might not be robust—not because of falsification or
something egregious, but merely due to the mechanics of the
problem.”98 As Zacharias Maniadis et al. explain, “[t]he common
reliance on statistical significance as the sole criterion leads to an

96. Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 61, at 3. This result is analogous to a Dutch study
that found that taxpayers evading in one year were more likely to do so in a later year. See
infra note 408 and accompanying text.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 63–69.
98. See Zacharias Maniadis et al., One Swallow Doesn’t Make a Summer: New Evidence on
Anchoring Effects, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 277, 278 (2014) (“[O]ur theoretical model suggests that
many surprising new empirical results are likely not recovering true associations.”).
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excessive number of false positives”99 because “the statistical power
of the test and the fraction of tested hypotheses that are true
associations” also matter.100 A bias toward publication of surprising
or unexpected results exacerbates the problem.101
Moreover, in addition to the small number of studies, the daycare center and hospital studies are non-tax studies, so they do not
bear directly on the question of whether sanctions crowd out
taxpayers’ intrinsic motivation to pay taxes. The next Part discusses
this theory and argues that, in the tax context, the evidence from
empirical studies suggests that deterrence generally is effective.
II. DETERRENCE AS A TOOL FOR FOSTERING TAX COMPLIANCE
Noncompliance with a tax saves that taxpayer money, at least
up front, but it carries risks. The government imposing the tax
typically audits taxpayers and imposes penalties for detected
noncompliance.102 Accordingly, economic models of tax
compliance generally consider tax evasion a decision under
uncertainty.103 The basic idea is that the existence of a penalty for
noncompliance deters tax evasion but only in light of the
probability that a penalty will actually be imposed. For example, a
taxpayer who omits from income an amount resulting in
understated tax of $1000 and who faces a 1% chance of audit that
will detect the evasion and a 20% penalty in addition to the tax if
detected ($1200 in total)104 faces an “expected” (probabilistic) cost
of $12.

99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 288.
Id.
Id.
See I.R.C. § 6662(a), (b) (2012) (imposing a 20% penalty for such things as negligence or substantial understatement of tax); § 6663(a) (“If any part of any underpayment of
tax required to be shown on a return is due to fraud, there shall be added to the tax an amount
equal to 75 percent of the portion of the underpayment which is attributable to fraud.”).
When penalties are imposed, taxpayers likely experience the resulting tax bill, which will
include interest, as high. See Lederman, supra note 70, at 1466 & n.67.
103. See, e.g., Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical
Analysis, 3 J. PUB. ECON. 323, 323–26 (1972); T.N. Srinivasan, Tax Evasion: A Model, 2 J. PUB.
ECON. 339, 340 (1973).
104. These are realistic figures. See infra note 108 (official IRS audit rate for individuals
is just under 1%); supra note 102 (20% penalty).
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This very basic model has a number of simplifying
assumptions. It assumes that taxpayers know the odds of detection
and sanction levels and that they are risk-neutral. However,
individuals may overestimate the likelihood that noncompliance
will be detected and fined, which would tend to increase
compliance by raising the expected cost of cheating. Corporate
taxpayers are more likely to have sophisticated tax advisors who
know the odds. Individuals are also less likely to be risk-neutral
than corporate taxpayers. 105 Risk aversion would tend to
increase compliance.106
A. The False Puzzle and “Tax Morale”
Even if we were to assume that all audits detect all noncompliance and result in the imposition of a penalty—which is not
true—federal income tax penalties may be too low in light of
existing audit rates (and vice versa) to make compliance the wealthmaximizing choice. That is, penalties are a fraction (in the United
States, typically 20%) of understated tax.107 The IRS reports audit
rates for U.S. individuals of under 1%,108 making the expected value

105. See Joel Slemrod, The Economics of Corporate Tax Selfishness, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 877, 882
(2004) (“[T]he assumption of risk aversion seems unsatisfactory for a large publicly-held
firm, because presumably the shareholders hold diversified portfolios, implying that the firm
should behave as if it is risk-neutral, even if its shareholders are not.”).
106. See, e.g., Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 103, at 329 (“We can then conclude that
when actual income varies, the fraction declared increases, stays constant or decreases
according [sic] as relative risk aversion is an increasing, constant or decreasing function of
income.”); Paul J. Beck & Woon-Oh Jung, Taxpayer Compliance Under Uncertainty, 8 J. ACCT.
& PUB. POL’Y 1, 18 (1989) (“Risk-averse taxpayers were shown to have incentives to increase
their reported income (compliance) as the tax rate increases when penalties were proportional to the amount of underpaid taxes.”).
107. See supra note 102.
108. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SVC., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
DATA BOOK, 2015, at 23 (Mar. 2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/15databk.pdf
(reporting that 0.8% of individual tax returns and 1.3% of corporate returns were examined
for fiscal year (FY) 2015); DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SVC., INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK, 2014, at 26 (Mar. 2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs
-soi/14databk.pdf (reporting that 0.9% of individual tax returns and 1.3% of corporate
returns were examined for FY 2014). These are official IRS audit rates. The National Taxpayer
Advocate has explained that the IRS makes additional “compliance contacts with taxpayers
that it does not consider to be ‘real’ audits. These types of contacts . . . include math error
corrections, Automated Underreporter (AUR) (a document matching program), identity and
wage verification, and Automated Substitute for Return (ASFR) (a non-filer program).” NTA
Blog: “Real” vs. “Unreal” Audits and Why This Distinction Matters, TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV.
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of any penalty less than 1% of its nominal value, even assuming
that audits detect all cheating and always result in the imposition
of a penalty.109
So, in the example above, the expected cost of cheating was
$12.110 By contrast, the cost of compliance was the full $1000 tax. For
the expected cost of cheating to equal the cost of compliance, “an
audit rate of 1% would require a $99,000 penalty in this example.”111
Given these low levels of audit rates and penalties, it seems that a
rational wealth-maximizing taxpayer should cheat whenever
possible. Thus, at first cut, the basic economic model would seem
to predict that no one pays any taxes.112 Yet the IRS estimates an
overall voluntary compliance rate with U.S. federal taxes of almost
82% of dollars due.113
Many scholars have relied on this type of contrast to argue that
deterrence does not explain tax compliance.114 They argue that the

(July 6, 2018), https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/news/nta-blog-real-vs-unreal-audits-andwhy-this-distinction-matters. “When adding these ‘unreal’ audit numbers to the ‘real’ ones,
the IRS’s combined coverage rate jumps to over six percent.” Id. An audit rate of 6% would
make the expected cost of cheating a still low $72 (6% of $1200).
Taxpayers are selected for audit in various ways. See supra note 2. The IRS’s whistleblower program plays a small part in that process. IRS, IRS WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM
FISCAL YEAR 2016 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 10 tbl.1, https://www.irs.gov/pub
/whistleblower/fy16_wo_annual_report_final.pdf (reporting that 240 claims were made in
2014, 204 in 2015, and 761 in 2016).
109. Even if a taxpayer erroneously believed that the audit rate is (a grossly inflated)
30% and the penalty rate is 50%, for example, while that would increase the expected cost of
cheating to $450 in the example (30% of $1500), it remains lower than the $1000 cost
of compliance.
110. That is, 1% of $1200. See supra text accompanying note 104. If the taxpayer’s behavior meets the burden of proof for fraud, the taxpayer would owe $1750 (the $1000 plus a
75% penalty). At a 1% audit rate, the expected value of the penalty is only $17.50.
111. Lederman, supra note 70, at 1465 (footnotes omitted).
112. See Dick J. Hessing et al., Does Deterrence Deter? Measuring the Effect of Deterrence
on Tax Compliance in Field Studies and Experimental Studies, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 291, 293
(Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (“Given the current mild sanctions and low probability of detection,
this kind of [economics] approach would predict that virtually everyone should be
evading tax . . . .”).
113. See INTERNAL REVENUE SVC., TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2008–2010, at 3
(Apr. 2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/tax%20gap%20estimates%20for%20200
8%20through%202010.pdf (overall 81.7% voluntary compliance rate).
114. Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner’s Law and Social
Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 367, 377 (2002) (“Tax compliance rates—which vary dramatically
across nations—seem to bear no connection to enforcement levels.”); see, e.g., James Alm et
al., Economic and Noneconomic Factors in Tax Compliance, 48 KYKLOS 3, 3 (1995) (“[T]he real
puzzle [of tax compliance] is ‘Why is there so little cheating?’”) (emphasis removed); cf. Eric
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high level of voluntary compliance is a puzzle that the economic
model cannot explain.115 For example, Bruno Frey has claimed:
Empirical research has convincingly established that it is
impossible to account for the extent of tax paying by only
considering the expected punishment. The crucial question is not
why people do not pay their taxes, but rather “Why is there so
little cheating?” To some extent, paying one’s taxes is a “quasivoluntary” act attributable to an intrinsic motivation to contribute
to the burden of taxation. Risk aversion is not able to account for
the extent of taxes paid in the United States and Switzerland.116

Although Frey does not fully reject the deterrence model, he
argues that it is inapplicable in some countries where, instead, “tax
morale” is what prompts compliance.117 Although tax morale
generally means simply an intrinsic compliance motivation,118 Frey
sources it in “participatory governments” that have “(semi-) direct
democracies, in which the citizens have initiative and referendum
rights.”119 He points to California, Oregon, and Switzerland, and
states that “civic virtue emerges which, with respect to taxation,
shows up as tax morale,” contrasting that with “exploitative
governments ruling their people in an authoritarian or even

Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1782 (2000) (“A
widespread view among tax scholars holds that law enforcement does not explain why
people pay taxes.”).
115. See Alm, supra note 114, at 3; infra note 116 and accompanying text.
116. Frey, supra note 52, at 92 (citations omitted) (quoting Alm, supra note 114); see also
Ronald G. Cummings et al., Tax Morale Affects Tax Compliance: Evidence from Surveys and an
Artefactual Field Experiment, 70 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 447, 449 (2009) (“[E]xtreme . . . risk
aversion would be required to explain observed . . . compliance. Other factors must be at
work.”); Frey, supra note 50, at 387 (making a similar argument). Feld and Frey estimated the
1995 voluntary compliance rate for Switzerland at 77.7%. Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Tax
Evasion in Switzerland: The Roles of Deterrence and Tax Morale, in TAX EVASION, TRUST AND
STATE CAPACITIES 134 (Nicolas Hayoz & Simon Hug eds., 2007).
117. See Frey, supra note 50, at 388–89 (“[S]eek[ing] to demonstrate that intrinsic
motivation in the form of ‘tax morale’ is of substantial importance in explaining tax
paying behavior.”).
118. See id.; see also, e.g., Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers
Are Treated, 3 ECON. GOVERNANCE 87, 88 (2002) (“[T]he existence of an intrinsic motivation
to pay taxes . . . has sometimes been called ‘tax morale.’”). This Article does not deny that
there are intrinsic motivations to pay taxes. See infra text accompanying notes 161–166. The
issue this Article tackles is whether deterrence crowds out those motivations, such that it
reduces tax compliance.
119. Frey, supra note 50, at 390.
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dictatorial way” and governments that lie between these poles.120
Thus, Frey argues that, in places such as Switzerland, the deterrence model does not explain tax compliance; intrinsic motivations
do. However, he found in a survey of Swiss cantons that fines
increased tax compliance,121 which is contrary to his prediction and
instead supports the deterrence model.
Frey’s reliance on intrinsic motivation as the explanation for
high compliance levels starts from the premise that if extremely
high-risk aversion—which he rejects as not true in practice122—does
not explain the observed compliance levels, there must be a missing
factor, which he identifies as tax morale.123 However, tax morale
need not be the explanation. In fact, Frey quotes Michael Graetz and
Louis Wilde as stating, “the high compliance rate can only be
explained either by taxpayers’ . . . commitment to the responsibilities of citizenship and respect for the law or lack of opportunity
for tax evasion.”124 These are not the same two possible explanations
that Frey presents when he points to tax morale and risk aversion.125
While there is certainly room for civic commitments and respect for
the law as explanations for some compliance, the lack of
opportunity for tax evasion—which Frey does not analyze as a
possible explanation—explains much tax compliance and is
consistent with the deterrence model.126
120. Id.
121. See id. at 397 (reporting that increased size of punishment decreases tax evasion);

see also id. at 387 (stating that only the size of the fine was statistically significant at p < 0.05
level in a model predicting tax evasion in the Swiss cantons).
122. See id. at 387. (“The conventionally used measure of risk aversion by Arrow-Pratt
would have to be more than 30 in order to account for the present compliance rate in that
country [the United States]. The actually measured level of risk aversion reported, however,
lies only between 1 and 2.”).
123. See id. at 388 (arguing that the deterrence model “is at best incomplete, and may
even be wrong” and that tax morale is “the missing factor”).
124. Id. at 389 (quoting Michael J. Graetz & Louis L. Wilde, The Economics of Tax
Compliance: Facts and Fantasy, 3 NAT’L TAX J. 355, 358 (1985)) (emphasis added). On the same
page, the Graetz and Wilde article states, “Any economic analysis of the various components
of noncompliance must . . . take into account not only . . . institutional constraints on the level
of punishment or audits, but also differences in opportunities to understate taxes.” Graetz &
Wilde, supra at 358.
125. See supra text accompanying note 116 (quoting Frey, supra note 52, at 92, and
referring to intrinsic motivation and risk aversion).
126. See, e.g., James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 818, 821 (1998)
(“[W]e may ask, why are so many households honest, and why don’t cheaters cheat by more?
Part of the explanation lies in the dramatic increase in information reporting . . . since the
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1. The importance of opportunity to evade
As I have explained in previous work, the stark dichotomy
embodied in the purported puzzle sets aside an important feature
of the federal income tax system, which is that taxpayers do not
have an open opportunity to evade taxes on all of their income.127
Many sources of income are subject to third-party reporting, and it
is much easier for the government to match an information return
with a taxpayer’s return than to conduct an audit. Thus, practically
speaking, information-return matching is a highly effective form of
audit not captured in audit statistics.128 Recent IRS figures show
that the voluntary compliance rate with respect to income subject
to withholding and substantial information reporting is 99%, and
the rate with just substantial information reporting is 93%.129 Even
income amounts subject to partial information reporting have a
voluntary compliance rate of 81%. By contrast, income subject to no
information reporting has a compliance rate of only 37%.130 One
scholar accurately observed that use of third-party reporting is so

1960s.”); Henrik Jacobsen Kleven et al., Unwilling or Unable to Cheat? Evidence from a Tax Audit
Experiment in Denmark, 79 ECONOMETRICA 651, 653 (2011) (“[O]ur findings suggest that tax
evasion is low, not because taxpayers are unwilling to cheat, but because they are unable to
cheat successfully due to the widespread use of third-party reporting.”); Susan Cleary Morse
et al., Cash Businesses and Tax Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 37, 67 (2009) (“Our interview
results here generally agree with other research cited above: Tax cheating follows
opportunity, not complexity or immorality . . . .”); Mark D. Phillips, Individual Income Tax
Compliance and Information Reporting: What Do the U.S. Data Show?, 67 NAT’L TAX J. 531, 563
(2014) (“Using U.S. taxpayer-level data from the 2001 NRP, this paper has shown that the
presence and amount of unmatched income are the primary determinants of income tax
noncompliance.”); Joel Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion, 21 J. ECON.
PERSP. 25, 37 (2007) (“Line item by line item, there is a clear positive correlation between the
rate of compliance and the presence of enforcement mechanisms such as information reports
and employer withholding.”).
127. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in
Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 697 (2007) (“An essential missing piece of this seeming
puzzle is that the federal income tax law benefits from structural mechanisms that constrain
payment with respect to the major sources of income for many people . . . .”); Lederman,
supra note 70, at 1460 (“[T]he eighty-three percent [voluntary compliance] figure is
misleading because it is an aggregate comprised of differing levels of compliance that
correspond to differences in opportunity to evade tax.”).
128. Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 KAN. L. REV. 971,
975 (2003).
129. See INTERNAL REVENUE SVC., supra note 113, at 5.
130. Id. The fact that this is not zero is discussed infra in text accompanying notes
150–152.
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widespread that “the notion that deterrence is weak is to some
extent an illusion.”131
Moreover, a study in Denmark found a near-zero noncompliance rate by individuals for income subject to information
reporting, which contrasted with a substantial noncompliance rate
by the same individuals for income not subject to third-party
reporting.132 This was true both for individuals with mostly selfreported income and for those with mostly third-party-reported
income.133 In particular, “the evasion rate for self-employment
income conditional on third-party reporting is only 0.33%,
suggesting that overall tax evasion among the self-employed is
large because of the information environment and not because of,
for example, different preferences among those choosing selfemployment (such as attitudes toward risk and cheating).”134
A laboratory experiment also supports the notion that the same
individual reports third-party-reported income at a higher rate
than other income.135 Participants in the study had the opportunity
to earn income by doing a simple task on the computer.136 They
were then told how much of the income is “matched” (subject to
information reporting) and how much is “nonmatched.”137 Their
reports were subject to audit at a rate of 10% or 30%.138 The study
found that the overall compliance rate for matched income was

131. Dwenger et al., supra note 42, at 204; see also Erzo F.P. Luttmer & Monica Singhal,
Tax Morale, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 149, 152 (2014) (explaining that, given low evasion on amounts
reported to the IRS, “inferring tax morale as residual compliance in the Allingham and
Sandmo (1972) model is credible only in settings without third-party reporting”).
132. Kleven et al., supra note 126, at 653.
133. Id. In Denmark, information received from third-party information reports is
included in prepopulated returns that taxpayers are sent to complete. Id. at 659.
134. Id. at 670. The evasion level in that study for self-reported income was 41.6%. Id.
at 671. Kleven et al. also found that “the effects of social variables are small and mostly
insignificant, whereas variables that capture information (presence and size of self-reported
income, self-employment, audit flags, and prior audit adjustments) have very strong effects.
This confirms the conclusion that information and traceability are central to the compliance
decision.” Id. at 676.
135. James Alm et al., Do Individuals Comply on Income Not Reported by Their Employer?,
37 PUB. FIN. REV. 120, 121 (2009).
136. Id. at 127.
137. Id.
138. Id. “Increasing the audit probability from 10 to 30 percent increases compliance by
4.9 percentage points, all else equal.” Id. at 136. That variable was significant at p < 0.01. See
id. at 135 tbl.3.
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54.2%, while for nonmatched income it was 41.4%, and the
difference was statistically significant.139
Opportunity to evade is relevant for firms, too. For example,
Dina Pomeranz found a positive effect of an audit threat on
compliance by Chilean firms with a Value-Added Tax (VAT),
which was submitted monthly.140 The Chilean tax authority sent
102,000 randomly selected companies a letter stating, in part, “your
firm has been selected for analysis. In the event that any
irregularities are detected, you could be summoned for an audit.”141
The result was an immediate increase in VAT remittances,142 and it
was primarily driven by the transactions for which there is no
paper trail—sales to customers—as opposed to between-firm
transactions in the supply chain, where firms have an incentive to
ask for receipts from their suppliers.143 Thus, it appears that the
existence of a paper trail, like an increase in the audit rate, raises
perceived detection risk.144
Similarly, James Alm et al. found that the average compliance
rate across the New Mexico firms in their study was 43%, but it
varied widely across industries.145 They found that firms that have
a greater opportunity to evade taxes—as evidenced by providing
services, having an out-of-state mailing address, and exhibiting
greater variation in claimed deductions—are less compliant with a
sales tax.146 However, firms’ compliance increased when the
(perceived) audit rate increased.147 In fact, if an individual monitors
firm compliance (contrary to the usual arrangement, where firms

139. Id. at 133 (p < 0.05).
140. Dina Pomeranz, No Taxation Without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in

the Value Added Tax, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2539, 2543 (2015).
141. Id. at 2547 & n.16.
142. “The median declared VAT increases by about 12 percent and then slowly decreases to reach the same levels as the control group after about 15 months.” Id. at 2557.
143. Id. at 2540, 2543–44.
144. Id. at 2541.
145. James Alm et al., Audit Selection and Firm Compliance with a Broad-Based Sales Tax,
57 NAT’L TAX J. 209, 217 (2004).
146. Id. at 225. Missing filing deadlines was also a statistically significant predictor of
noncompliance. Id. at 223.
147. Id. at 211, 223–25.
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generally provide information reports on individuals148), studies
suggest that firms’ compliance increases.149
2. Other factors affecting tax compliance
These studies, which highlight the importance of the
opportunity to evade, support the idea that deterrence spurs
compliance. Of course, lack of opportunity to evade does not
explain all tax compliance.150 For one thing, U.S. taxpayers pay an
estimated 37% of tax dollars due on income not subject to
information reporting, such as self-employment income.151 That
figure is quite low in comparison to the other voluntary compliance
figures, but it is not zero.152

148. See Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When Is
Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733, 1739–40 (2010) (explaining that
information reporting is most efficient when done by centralized parties acting at arms’
length and with a bookkeeping infrastructure, which typically means businesses).
149. See generally Todd Kumler et al., Enlisting Employees in Improving Payroll-Tax
Compliance: Evidence from Mexico (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19385,
Apr. 2015), http://www.columbia.edu/~ev2124/research/KumlerVerhoogen&FriasApril
2015.pdf (finding that pension reform that gave younger workers an incentive to monitor
their employers’ wage reporting, and the information to do so, resulted in reduced
underreporting of wages for younger workers by firms (and thus reduced payroll tax
evasion)); Joana Naritomi, Consumers as Tax Auditors (May 2016) (working paper),
https://www.dropbox.com/s/1e0bctgjji4s01c/naritomi_enforcement_May2016.pdf?dl=0
(finding that a São Paulo, Brazil, program that provided consumers with incentives in the
form of tax rebates and lottery participation for requesting receipts, as well as for checking
online the retailers’ reports of their transactions, increased retailers’ reported revenues for
tax purposes by at least 22% over a four-year period).
150. See Andreoni et al., supra note 126, at 822 (explaining that, for 1992, 91.7% of all
reportable income was reported, although only three-quarters of income was subject to
information reporting). Taxpayers who receive most of their income in forms subject to
information reporting could cheat by inventing or exaggerating deductions or credits not
subject to information reporting. However, IRS data show that much more noncompliance
occurs on the income side of the ledger. New IRS Study Provides Preliminary Tax Gap Estimate,
I.R.S. News Release IR-2005-38 (Mar. 29, 2005), https://www.irs.gov/uac/New-IRS-Study
-Provides-Preliminary-Tax-Gap-Estimate (“For individual underreporting, more than 80
percent comes from understated income, not overstated deductions.”). One reason is that
some taxpayers who are willing to skip an item may not be willing to affirmatively lie. M.
Bernard Aidinoff et al., Report and Recommendations on Taxpayer Compliance, 41 TAX LAW . 329,
376 (1988). In addition, inflated amounts that appear on the return are easier for the IRS to
audit than wholly unreported items are.
151. See INTERNAL REVENUE SVC., TAX GAP FOR TAX YEAR 2006 OVERVIEW (Jan. 6, 2012),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/overview_tax_gap_2006.pdf.
152. Of course, much of that reporting could be deterrence-motivated, including
reporting amounts received with a paper trail, such as via credit card.
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Part of that level of compliance may be due to deterrence
aspects that are missing from the very basic model described above,
such as criminal penalties. First, individuals may be risk averse
about the prospect of going to prison, as well as the stigma
associated with criminal tax evasion.153 They may also overestimate
the likelihood of prosecution, which is very small.154 Two empirical
studies using IRS data found that criminal tax enforcement
increases tax compliance.155
Second, the simple economic model applied above treated the
audit rate as exogenously determined, which is not realistic. The
likelihood that a taxpayer will be audited is endogenous, in that it
depends on what the taxpayer reports.156 The IRS does some
random audits for research purposes and selects some taxpayers
for audit for other reasons, but its primary approach is to score tax
returns using a secret formula designed to detect which returns are
most noncompliant.157 Thus, an average audit rate may be
misleadingly low as applied to someone engaging in tax evasion.

153. See Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The Anatomy of Tax Evasion, 5 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 1, 21 (1989) (“For tax evasion, fear of stigmatization may be a particularly powerful
deterrent because most taxpayers have no criminal record.”); see also Jeffrey A. Dubin,
Criminal Investigation Enforcement Activities and Taxpayer Noncompliance, 35 PUB. FIN. REV. 500,
523 (2007) (finding that incarceration and probation have a greater influence than fines on
tax compliance).
154. Between fiscal years 2007 and 2016, the IRS initiated an average of 2621 tax investigations each year, peaking at 3325 in 2013. Enforcement Statistics, IRS, https://www.irs.gov
/compliance/criminal-investigation/enforcement-statistics-criminal-investigation-ci-enforce
ment-strategy (last updated Sept. 30, 2017).
155. See Dubin, supra note 153, at 502 (finding statistically significant positive results
from IRS Criminal Investigation prosecutions resulting in sentences on tax compliance);
Alan H. Plumley, The Determinants of Individual Income Tax Compliance: Estimating the Impacts
of Tax Policy, Enforcement, and IRS Responsiveness, I.R.S. Publication 1916, at 36 (Nov. 1996),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/pub1916b.pdf (finding that U.S. states with a higher
proportion of criminal tax convictions have higher compliance with tax-reporting
obligations, and also finding that criminal convictions have “an equally significant, but
smaller, positive impact on offsets reporting”).
156. See, e.g., James Alm et al., Tax Compliance with Endogenous Audit Selection Rules, 46
KYKLOS 27, 27 (1993) (“[T]he government tax agency does not select tax returns randomly for
audit but instead uses information from the returns to determine strategically whom
to audit.”).
157. Leigh Osofsky, Concentrated Enforcement, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 325, 335–36 (2014)
(“[V]arious government authorities have indicated that the IRS . . . employs a ‘worst-first’
approach by focusing on taxpayers who are likely to be the most noncompliant, as
determined by deviation from others.”).
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Sophisticated models of tax compliance treat the audit rate
as endogenous.158
Third, that very basic economic model ignores the possibility of
“non-pecuniary costs of evading taxes such as embarrassment, loss
of self-esteem, and social status.”159 A taxpayer may also increase
compliance to try to avoid the time, hassle, and expense involved
in an audit.160
However, other factors undoubtedly affect tax compliance. For
example, some studies have shown a limited positive effect of
procedural fairness by the tax collector.161 A cross-country study in
Latin America found a positive effect of better governance
institutions, particularly citizen “voice” in government, supporting
Swiss scholar Bruno Frey’s argument that higher tax morale
increases tax compliance.162 Yet studies generally do not show a
positive effect of moral suasion letters that focus on the public
goods that the government provides to taxpayers, such as

158. See, e.g., Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 103, at 331–32 (including a model with
audit rate endogenously determined); Andreoni et al., supra note 126, at 824–31 (discussing
two variations on a model, one in which the tax authority pre-commits to an audit rule and
one in which it does not).
159. Sharmila King & Steven M. Sheffrin, Tax Evasion and Equity Theory: An Investigative
Approach, 9 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 505, 507 (2002).
160. See Helen V. Tauchen, Tax Compliance: An Investigation Using Individual Taxpayer
Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) Data, 9 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 177, 194
(1993) (“Fears of bureaucracy, time costs, and other factors associated with an audit may play
as important a role in securing compliance as do the monetary penalties that might result
from an audit.”); cf. Stephan Muehlbacher et al., Uncertainty Resolution in Tax Experiments:
Why Waiting for an Audit Increases Compliance, 41 J. SOCIO-ECON. 289, 290 (2012) (finding
higher tax compliance in a lab experiment if the random audits were conducted three weeks
later instead of immediately).
161. See Lederman, supra note 128, at 1000–04 (discussing studies of this issue).
162. See Richard M. Bird et al., Societal Institutions and Tax Effort in Developing Countries,
15 ANNALS OF ECON. & FIN. 185, 209 (2014). The voice variables are statistically significant,
generally at p < 0.01. See id. at 211 tbl.2. That study also found a positive effect of a “Tax
Morale” variable that was based on the per-country level of self-reported belief in the
justifiability of tax cheating. See id. at 201, 207, 216 tbl.7 (defining the terms and the variable;
reporting effects, which were significant at p < 0.05 for “Revenue Effort,” defined as current
revenues/gross domestic product, but not significant for “Tax Effort”).
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education and snow removal,163 even in Switzerland,164 where tax
morale is stated to be high.165
By contrast, several field studies have shown that appealing to
compliance norms may have a positive effect.166 In fact, normsbased appeals may bolster enforcement efforts.167 A 2009 study of
individuals from the neighboring countries of Botswana and South
Africa168 supports the idea that enforcement efforts are more
effective where compliance norms are stronger. The study first
compared the self-reported commitment to honest taxpaying
among individuals in the two countries and found self-reported
honesty to be higher in Botswana than in South Africa.169 That
suggests a stronger taxpaying norm in Botswana.
The study then compared the simulated tax compliance
decisions of individuals from the two countries because they have

163. See, e.g., Arial, supra note 73, at 27, 41–45, 58 (finding that a letter to Israeli
corporations, explaining how tax dollars were allocated, providing reasons for paying taxes,
and highlighting the societal harm from not paying, resulted in a small but statistically
significant effect in the direction of noncompliance with a Value Added Tax (VAT)); STEPHEN
COLEMAN, MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, THE MINNESOTA INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE
EXPERIMENT: STATE TAX RESULTS 5 (1996), http://www.revenue.state.mn.us/research_stats
/research_reports/19xx/research_reports_content_complnce.pdf (finding no effect of letter
stating “your income tax dollars are spent on services that we Minnesotans depend on” and
listing items). But cf. Michael Chirico et al., An Experimental Evaluation of Notification Strategies
to Increase Property Tax Compliance: Free-Riding in the City of Brotherly Love, in 30 TAX POL’Y &
ECON. 129, 146 tbl.5 (Jeffrey R. Brown ed.) (2016), http://www.nber.org/chapters/c13
690.pdf (finding that a Public Service letter had a statistically significant effect at p < 0.05 on
one subgroup, single-property owners). A U.K. study combined a norms-based appeal and
moral suasion into one letter, confounding the analysis. See John Hasseldine et al., Persuasive
Communications: Tax Compliance Enforcement Strategies for Sole Proprietors, 24 CONTEMP. ACCT.
RES. 171, 178 (2007). That letter was significant only for self-preparers (at p < 0.01). Id. at 181
tbl.1, 184.
164. See Benno Torgler, Moral-Suasion: An Alternative Tax Policy Strategy? Evidence from
a Controlled Field Experiment in Switzerland, 5 ECON. GOVERNANCE 235, 239–40 (2004). Torgler
found an insignificant effect on timely filing or payment in Trimbach, Switzerland, of this
moral appeal: “If the taxpayers did not contribute their share, our commune with its 6226
inhabitants would suffer greatly. With your taxes you help keep Trimbach attractive for its
inhabitants.” Id. at 240, 249–50 (emphasis omitted).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 118–120.
166. See Lederman, supra note 70, at 1471–75 (describing these studies).
167. See id. at 1497–99.
168. Cummings et al., supra note 116, at 447.
169. Id. at 451–52. “The marginal effects indicate that being a resident of Botswana
rather than of South Africa increases the probability of reporting the highest tax honesty by
around 6 percentage points, and this result is robust . . . .” Id. at 452. This is significant at
p < 0.01. Id. at 452 tbl.3.
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similar tax systems, but South Africa is much less politically
stable.170 The authors framed the experiment as a tax-reporting
decision where reporting could be audited and a fine imposed on
undisclosed income.171 The audit rate was endogenously determined based on the amount of income reported.172
The study found greater compliance by individuals in
Botswana than those in South Africa, as the authors expected.173
They attributed that result to higher tax morale in Botswana, which
has better governance.174 However, what the study actually tested
was the effect of differing compliance norms and cultures on a
simulated taxpaying decision.175 Because the two countries are
similar apart from their quality of governance, it is logical to
hypothesize that the better government resulted in stronger
taxpaying norms.176 However, the authors did not test that, and it
is theoretically possible that stronger taxpaying norms (resulting
from some other cause) and the resulting higher tax payments
produced better governance structures.177
Regardless, what is most important from a deterrence
perspective is that the Botswana/South Africa study also found
that, for both countries, compliance rates increase with an increase
in the audit or penalty rate.178 This suggests that deterrence does
not crowd out intrinsic motivations to pay taxes. In fact, the authors
found that “while compliance does increase with enforcement
effort, the effect is less in the country for which governance is less
good.”179 This suggests that enforcement and tax morale—if that is

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 449–50.
Id. at 453.
Id. at 454.
Id. at 455–56. This effect is significant at p < 0.05. Id.
Id. at 450 (“Botswana . . . refers to itself as the ‘gem of Africa’ in many . . .
publications.” (citation omitted)).
175. Id. at 449, 452 (“[T]he objective of our research is to examine the effect of cultural
factors and social norms on tax compliance behavior . . . .”).
176. The authors state that “[i]f these norms evolve from perceptions that the quality of
governance is high, we predict we will observe differences in tax compliance that are
correlated with these perceptions.” Id. at 449.
177. Cf. Bird et al., supra note 162, at 209 (pointing out these two possibilities in
their study).
178. Cummings et al., supra note 116, at 454. The effect of the audit rate is significant at
p < 0.01. Id. at 455 tbl.6. The significance of the penalty rate is not reported.
179. Id. at 448. This study thus supports the argument that enforcement complements
compliance norms. See Lederman, supra note 70.
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what is driving the differing compliance rates across the two
countries—may be complements, not substitutes.
And even if higher tax morale stemming from good government increases compliance, as Frey argues, this section has shown
that that does not by any means counter the effectiveness of
deterrence. The next section adds to the force of the deterrence
model by showing the positive effect on taxpayer compliance of
audits, which are a key component of the deterrence model, and the
smaller, but still generally positive, effect of sanctions.
B. The Effectiveness of Particular Deterrence Tools
1. Audits and audit threats
Generally speaking, the existence of audits has been found to
have a positive effect on tax compliance. Several studies have found
that increasing the audit rate increases compliance.180 In the United
States, the IRS has found both a direct effect of audits on tax
collections181 and an indirect effect of audits of approximately six
dollars for each dollar collected directly through enforcement.182
180. See James Alm, Tax Compliance and Administration, in HANDBOOK ON TAXATION 741,
756 (W. Bartley Hildreth & James A. Richardson eds., 1999) (“Nearly all studies have found
that a higher (random) audit rate leads to more compliance . . . ; however, . . . this impact
appears to be small and nonlinear, so that the deterrent effect of a higher audit rate
eventually diminishes.” (citation omitted)); see also, e.g., Alm et al., supra note 135, at 135–36
(finding in lab experiment that “[t]he compliance rate increases by 3.8 percentage points for
an increase in the audit success rate of 25 percentage points”); Nipoli Kamdar, Corporate
Income Tax Compliance: A Time Series Analysis, 25 ATLANTIC ECON. J. 37, 45–46 (1997) (finding
for the sample period of 1961 to 1987 that “audits play a statistically significant role in
promoting corporate [tax] compliance”); Plumley, supra note 155, at 35–36 (finding an 11.7 to
1 indirect effect of audits started in 1991). Note that laboratory experiments, which use
computer simulations, can determine the participant’s actual compliance. Field experiments
cannot, so they generally compare changes in reported income (or some other
reported amount).
181. The National Taxpayer Advocate reported that the direct effect of IRS audits of
1.5% of self-employed taxpayers in fiscal year 2014 was more than $3 billion in recommended
additional taxes. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, Audit Impact Study, in 2 TAS RESEARCH AND
RELATED STUDIES 67, 68 (2015), http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default
/Documents/2015ARC/ARC15_Volume2_3-AuditImpact.pdf. For fiscal years 2008–10, the
IRS anticipated collecting an average of $52 billion via late payments and enforcement
actions. See INTERNAL REVENUE SVC., supra note 113, at 3.
182. See Department of the Treasury: Internal Revenue Service, in APPENDIX, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2016, at 1035, 1035, https://www.gpo.gov
/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2016-APP/pdf/BUDGET-2016-APP-1-19.pdf; see also Jeffrey A.
Dubin et al., The Effect of Audit Rate on the Federal Individual Income Tax, 1977–1986, 43 NAT’L
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Moreover, a recent study found that an increase in the IRS’s faceto-face audit rate has a positive spillover effect on individuals’
compliance with state income taxes.183 This makes sense, given that
state income tax regimes generally use the federal income tax base
as a starting point.184
The positive effect of audits is not limited to the United States.
For example, Kleven et al. conducted an experiment in Denmark
involving both actual audits and letters threatening audit. They
thoroughly audited half of a representative sample of more than
42,000 individual income taxpayers, some employees and some
self-employed.185 They found a statistically significant positive
effect of the audits on income reported in the following year. The
difference was entirely due to income not subject to third-party
reporting,186 which is the income that is less visible absent an audit.
The year after the audits, Kleven et al. subdivided the audited
and unaudited taxpayers who were employees into three groups
each.187 The subdivisions were for a group that got no letter, a group
that was sent a letter informing its recipients that 50% of the group
would be audited, and a group sent a letter stating that the
recipient’s return definitely would be audited.188 The study found
that “audit threats have a positive impact on self-reported
income”189 and that the effect was about twice as strong for the
guaranteed audit than for the 50% audit threat.190 The effect of

TAX J. 395, 405 (1990) (finding that that the indirect effect of audits is responsible for six out
of every seven dollars of tax revenue); cf. Tauchen, supra note 160, at 179 (finding a two-toone indirect effect in a 1979 dataset).
183. Liucija Birskyte, Effects of Tax Auditing: Does the Deterrent Deter?, 8 RES. J. ECON.,
BUS. & ICT 1, 6 (2013). The study used aggregate data from all forty-one states that levied a
broad-based income tax. Id. at 3. The study found that “[a] 1% increase in federal audit rate,
on the average, increases individual income state tax collected per return by 1.74 dollars,
holding other variables constant.” Id. at 5. This was significant at the p < 0.01 level. Id.
184. See Heather M. Field, Binding Choices: Tax Elections & Federal/State Conformity, 32
VA. TAX REV. 527, 532 (2013).
185. Kleven et al., supra note 126, at 660.
186. Id. at 654. “For the full sample, the effect on total net income is 2557 kroner or 30.1
cents per additional kroner of audit adjustment. The effect on tax liability is 1375 kroner,
corresponding to 41.7 cents per dollar of audit adjustment. These estimates are strongly
significant.” Id. at 685.
187. Id. at 653, 662.
188. Id. at 653, 662–63.
189. Id. at 654.
190. Id. at 688.
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receiving an audit-threat letter was similar for the group that had
been audited the prior year and the group that had not.191 Kleven
et al. explained:
Because audits are rare events for a taxpayer, they are likely to
provide new information and therefore lead to a change in the
perceived detection probability. We may think of the detection
probability as a product of two probabilities: the probability of
audit and the probability of detection conditional on audit. Audits
may have an effect through both channels.192

The Chilean VAT study mentioned above included an auditwith-prior-notice treatment. The tax authority sent half of a sample
of companies with reporting patterns suggesting tax evasion193
prior notice of an audit, then summoned the whole group for an
audit.194 The study found that the deterrent effect of the audit
announcement had valuable spillover effects on companies in the
supply chain: “The randomly administered audit announcement
leads to strong spillover effects that increase VAT payments by the
suppliers of the treated firms. In line with the asymmetric
incentives between clients and suppliers in the self-enforcing
mechanism of the VAT, tax payments of client firms do not
increase.”195 The pro-compliance spillover effects are consistent
with both IRS data on the U.S. federal income tax196 and the study
that found a positive spillover of IRS audits onto state
tax collections.197
John Hasseldine and his coauthors studied sales and net profit
reporting in the United Kingdom by sole proprietors who reported
sales under £15,000 for two consecutive tax years.198 That amount
reflects an important reporting threshold: individuals and
partnerships with sales less than that amount were required to

191. Id. (“The broad conclusion from these estimates is that letter effects are roughly
the same in the 0% and 100% audit groups.”).
192. Id. at 681.
193. These patterns included things such as continually reporting sales less than costs,
without going out of business. Pomeranz, supra note 140, at 2549.
194. Id. at 2541, 2550.
195. Id. at 2541.
196. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
198. Hasseldine et al., supra note 163, at 171–72.

657

003.LEDERMAN_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/17/19 7:43 PM

2018

provide the tax authority only “turnover (sales), allowable
deductions, and net profit,” whereas other businesses had to
itemize all their income and expenses—a more burdensome
reporting obligation.199
Hasseldine et al. studied five types of letters from Inland
Revenue, including three sanction letters: (1) an audit threat, (2) a
“threat of audit with possible penalties,” and (3) an audit with prior
notice (described as a “virtual guarantee of forthcoming audit once
the return is filed”).200 They found that each of the three sanction
letters increased the sole proprietors’ reported net profits,
compared to the control group.201 The three sanction letters also all
had a statistically significant effect on turnover reported over
the threshold.202
As discussed above, in a recent church tax study in Germany,
the auditors knew the amount of tax due and thus could determine
if a taxpayer under complied, fully complied, or over complied.203
One set of treatments varied the audit probabilities announced in a
letter between 10, 20, and 50%, as well as including notched
probabilities stating that taxpayers faced an audit probability of
50% if they pay €10 or less, and zero chance of audit otherwise.204
The study found that this deterrence intervention had “strong
effects on compliance for baseline evaders, but small and mostly
insignificant effects for baseline donors”205—those who had
overpaid the tax.206 In addition, the notched audit letter was very
effective at increasing tax payments to more than €10.207 It is
possible that taxpayers treat a church tax differently from other
types of taxes. However, it is worth noting that this study not only
199. Id. at 177.
200. Id. at 172.
201. The “respective mean changes (F-statistics) of [Letters 3, 4, and 5 were] . . . £438

(4.303), £731 (19.431), and £976 (31.156).” Id. at 184. These increases were statistically
significant at p < 0.05. Id.
202. Id. at 181 (p < 0.05). While 39.7% of the control group reported turnover above the
threshold, the sanction groups were all above 50%. Id. (“The respective percentages
(x2-statistics) for those four groups were . . . 53.8 percent (x2 = 60.929), 56.4 percent (x2 =
82.075), and 53.7 percent (x2 = 42.575).”).
203. See Dwenger et al., supra note 42, at 204.
204. Id. at 223.
205. Id. at 205.
206. See id. at 204.
207. Id. at 223.
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supports the effectiveness of audit threats but also the possibility of
a slight “crowding in” of intrinsic motivations.208 This effect is
similar to the study comparing Botswana and South Africa, which
found that enforcement increased compliance more in Botswana,
the country with stronger compliance norms.209
The Minnesota Tax Compliance Experiment, which examined
the effects of several different letters on individual taxpayers, found
a slightly more mixed effect of an audit with prior notice (a letter to
a group of taxpayers stating that his or her return would be closely
examined, which it subsequently was).210 That letter increased
reported income and taxes paid for about 96.7% of the population—
all but high-income taxpayers.211 Moreover, the audit with prior
notice, which had a pro-compliance effect on taxpayers in the lowand middle-income strata, had a greater effect on low- and middleincome taxpayers who were “high-risk”212—those filing a federal
Schedule C for self-employment income or Schedule F for
farm income.213
However, the audit letter’s results were mixed and possibly
negative for the 3.3% of the population defined as “high income”
(those who have federal adjusted gross income of more than
$100,000).214 A recent study by Mazzolini et al. found a similar
result in Italy on the effect of actual audits: “[T]he average positive
audit effect that we detected . . . is driven by low and middle
reported-income taxpayers, while the effect is even negative at the
highest decile.”215

208.
209.
210.
211.

Id.
See supra text accompanying note 179.
COLEMAN, supra note 163, at 10–12.
Id. at 10–12, 22. Once the results were weighted to make the sample proportional
to the population, the additional taxes, when computed for the population of Minnesota,
would amount to $73 million for 1993. Stephen Coleman, Income Tax Compliance: A Unique
Experiment in Minnesota, GOV’T FIN. REV., Apr. 1997, at 5.
212. COLEMAN, supra note 163, at 12 (finding high-risk low- and middle-income
taxpayers increased reported taxes by $186 more than the controls, on average, compared to
$36 for the low-risk low- and middle-income taxpayers).
213. Id. 2.
214. Id. at 11.
215. Gabriele Mazzolini et al., The Deterrence Effect of Real-World Operational Tax Audits
21, 45 tbl.A1 (Dep’t of Econ. Mgmt. & Statistics, Univ. of Milan–Bicocca, Working Paper No.
359, Jan. 2017), http://dems.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper359.pdf.
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A recent study by Jason DeBacker et al. of U.S. C corporations
found an analogous result: corporations receiving a positive
adjustment (increase in taxes) in an IRS audit “subsequently
become more tax aggressive than when they receive a zero or
negative adjustment.”216 By contrast, their study of individuals
found that a positive adjustment increased compliance in the first
years after the audit.217 Taken together, the DeBacker, Mazzolini,
and Minnesota findings suggest that an audit may increase tax
aggressiveness in taxpayers with the most resources (who
presumably can afford to have a tax adviser and may be more likely
to treat tax reporting as a negotiation218).
In addition, although Minnesota’s audit letter had a positive
effect on taxpayers who had had their prior year’s taxes adjusted, it
had a negative effect on the subgroup who had paid a penalty the
year before. Moreover, the higher the penalty had been, the larger
the effect was.219 This could suggest an attempt at loss recoupment,
an effect discussed in Part III of this Article.
A recent study using country-level data hypothesized and
found a “U-shaped association between auditing220 and tax
evasion,”221 meaning “that compliance increases until a certain
auditing level is reached, and decreases beyond that level (i.e., an
elevated auditing level backfires).”222 However, it is important to
note that that study used as its measure of tax evasion “business
executives’ perception of the extent to which tax evasion is common

216. Jason DeBacker et al., Legal Enforcement and Corporate Behavior: An Analysis of Tax
Aggressiveness After an Audit, 58 J. LAW & ECON. 291, 311 (2015).
217. See infra text accompanying note 343.
218. See Joel Slemrod et al., Taxpayer Response to an Increased Probability of Audit: Evidence
from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 79 J. PUB. ECON. 455, 480–81 (2001).
219. COLEMAN, supra note 163, at 11. Results like this suggest that in studies along the
lines of the Israeli Day-care Center Study, it is worth examining separately the effects of the
fine regime on those who have been fined and those who have not been fined. See supra notes
61 and 68.
220. The overall audit rate is “the number of verification actions” divided by “the total
number of registered taxpayers for personal and corporate income taxes.” Juan P. Mendoza
et al., The Backfiring Effect of Auditing on Tax Compliance, 62 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 284, 287 (2017).
Thus, it is a blend of individual and corporate audit rates. “[Eighty-five percent] of the
untransformed auditing level observations lie between 0.2 and 20 verification actions per 100
taxpayers.” Id. at 288.
221. Id. at 284.
222. Id. at 285.
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practice in their country,”223 not actual government estimates of tax
evasion rates. Thus, what the study actually found is a correlation
between an overall audit rate that is higher than the average for the
countries studied224 and a higher perception of tax evasion on the
part of business executives. This outcome could suggest that the
correlation runs the other way: a comparatively high audit rate
causes businesspeople to perceive that noncompliance is high.225
The authors try to address that issue but state that “[a]lthough
[various] tests provide support for our hypothesis, endogeneity
cannot be fully ruled out with the available data . . . .”226

223. Id. at 286. “Respondents are top and middle management executives.” Id. at 287.
224. The study includes fifty countries, including many countries that belong to the

Organisation for Economic Development. See id. at 289 tbl.2 (listing countries ranging from
Argentina to United States).
225. That would presumably be because a high audit rate is a signal that the
government has determined that the enforcement rate needs to be high. A comparatively
low audit rate could also cause businesspeople to perceive that noncompliance is high
because of the risk that enforcement levels are too low to provide significant deterrence.
226. Mendoza et al., supra note 220, at 292. To deal with endogeneity, the Mendoza et
al. study used “a two-step system GMM estimator (Roodman, 2006), which uses lags as
instruments of possibly endogenous regressors.” Id. at 291. They note that “the number of
instruments does not exceed the number of countries (i.e., 47 < 50) . . . .” Id. This comports
with the “rule of thumb . . . to worry if the instrument count exceeds N.” David Roodman,
How to Do xtabond2: An Introduction to “Difference” and “System” GMM in Stata 43 (Ctr. for
Glob. Dev., Working Paper No. 103, Dec. 2006), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.982943.
However, in a companion paper that Mendoza et al. also cite, Roodman explains that that
limit is too high when the equation has endogenous regressors, and that the two-step system
GMM estimates become particularly problematic as the number of instruments approaches
N (in this case, the number of countries). See David Roodman, A Note on the Theme of Too
Many Instruments, 71 OXFORD BULL. ECON. & STAT. 135, 140 (2009); see also id. at 142 (citing
other studies that “suggest that merely keeping the instrument count below N does not
safeguard the [Hansen] J-test”). Roodman also provides examples of this problem using
replications of published empirical work. One study Roodman replicates “includes 75
instruments, compared with 77 countries and 353 observations.” Id. at 153. He runs tests that
reveal downward biases of standard errors caused by the large number of the instruments
in that study and finds that, if the number of instruments is reduced, the Hansen J statistic
declines dramatically, suggesting invalidity of system GMM instruments. Id. at 155. And if
the problematic system GMM instruments are dropped, several explanatory variables lose
their statistical significance. Roodman concludes that the “facts suggest that instrument
invalidity is the source of the . . . results.” Id. at 156. The author thanks Michael Alexeev for
pointing out this issue.
It would be helpful to examine Mendoza et al.’s analysis of the data. The article states
that “[i]nstructions to access the dataset and conduct the analysis are presented in the
Appendix.” Mendoza et al., supra note 220, at 286. However, the appendix does not seem to
accompany the article.
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Overall, these results suggest that an audit regime and audit
threats generally are effective deterrents. The next section focuses
on the effects of penalties, and Part III discusses the direct effect of
audits on the audited taxpayer’s subsequent reporting.
2. Penalties
a. Public goods games. The effects of penalties or penalty threats
may not be the same as the effects of audits or audit threats. However, laboratory experiments involving contributions to a public
good provide support for the beneficial effects of sanctions.227 In
these games, each participant is given an initial sum and the
opportunity to invest some or all of it in a group fund. The
experimenter will multiply the pot by a positive number and divide
the resulting amount equally among all participants regardless of
who contributed to the pot. Typically, the game is played for a set
number of rounds.228 The game is structured so that the best result
for the group is if everyone contributes the full stake provided by
the experimenter, while each individual’s maximizing strategy is to
contribute nothing, free riding on the others’ contributions.229
These experiments have found that many participants do
contribute, and on average, players start by contributing 40 to 60%
of their stake.230 In later rounds, players usually mirror others’
contributions.231 Because some players free ride from the outset,

227. The experimental games discussed in this section all involve public goods, with
players contributing to a common pool. Some of the initial experiments, however, such as
ultimatum games, are two-party, reciprocity games. Houser et al. found a negative effect of
punishment in a reciprocity context. Daniel Houser et al., When Punishment Fails: Research on
Sanctions, Intentions and Non-Cooperation, 62 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 509, 523 (2008)
(concluding in a gift-exchange game, where an “investor” sends an amount to a “trustee,”
which the experimenter triples, that trustees responded negatively to monetary incentives,
thus crowding out pro-social behavior).
228. See Lederman, supra note 70, at 1482.
229. See Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. ECON.
PERSP. 137, 139 (2000) (explaining that a rational player rationally should contribute zero in
the last round, and thus the penultimate round, and so on).
230. Id. at 140.
231. Id. at 142. One study found that approximately half of the players increased their
contributions in response to increases in others’ contributions, 14% did the same up to certain
contribution levels and then decreased their contributions, and approximately one-third of
players were free riders. Urs Fischbacher et al., Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence
from a Public Goods Experiment, 71 ECON. LETTERS 397, 398 (2001).
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and many mirror others’ behavior, the typical basic game results in
a progressive decline in contributions over the ten rounds.232
By contrast, when players can pay to punish defectors, that
possibility generally dramatically increases cooperation.233 A study
of the same public goods game in sixteen different countries found
that a punishment option resulted in differing levels of cooperation
in different countries, but in all of them, the availability of
punishment prevented a breakdown in cooperation.234 Another
experiment found that the least-trusting players were the most
likely to become strong contributors where there was a punishment
mechanism.235 One study found that punishment by a third party—
someone who had previously played the game—had a weaker
effect than punishment by other players, but it still significantly
increased contributions.236
Mizuho Shinada and Toshio Yamagishi examined the mechanism by which punishment works. Their study of two one-shot
prisoner’s dilemma games suggested that punishment has both a
direct effect on cooperation by altering its payoffs and an indirect
effect because it increases the expectation that others will
cooperate.237 Moreover, this was true whether punishments were
administered by other players or by a third party (the

232. Ostrom, supra note 229, at 140 (reporting that typically 70% of players contribute
nothing in the pre-announced final round of a public goods game).
To test whether players are learning the optimal strategy through successive rounds,
some experiments included a surprise “restart.” See James Andreoni, Why Free Ride?
Strategies and Learning in Public Goods Experiments, 37 J. PUB. ECON. 291, 300 (1988). They
found that players returned to high levels of giving in round eleven, behaving similarly to
round one, ruling out the possible explanation that it took players multiple rounds simply
to learn the incentives in the game. Id. at 298.
233. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 980 (2000); Colin F. Camerer & Ernst Fehr, Measuring Social Norms
and Preferences Using Experimental Games: A Guide for Social Scientists 11–12 (Inst. for Empirical
Research in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 97, Jan. 2002), https://www.
zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/51997/1/iewwp097.pdf.
234. Benedikt Herrmann et al., Antisocial Punishment Across Societies, 319 SCI. 1362
(2008); Benedikt Herrmann et al., Supporting Material for Antisocial Punishment Across
Societies 33 (Feb. 12, 2008), http://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/suppl/2008/03/06
/319.5868.1362.DC1/Hermann.SOM.pdf
235. Fehr & Gächter, supra note 233, at 984–85; see also Ostrom, supra note 229, at 141.
236. Camerer & Fehr, supra note 233, at 13.
237. Mizuho Shinada & Toshio Yamagishi, Punishing Free Riders: Direct and Indirect
Promotion of Cooperation, 28 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 330, 331–34 (2007).
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experimenter).238 This is consistent with economic modeling of
conditional cooperators239 and with IRS data suggesting that
enforcement actions have a positive indirect (or “shadow”) effect
on other taxpayers.240
In sum, these studies suggest that the availability of costly
punishment is very effective at increasing cooperation in an
experimental setting.241 The next section looks at whether this
extends to the tax context in field experiments.
b. Tax-focused experiments. A number of experiments have
examined the effects of sanctions on tax compliance. As mentioned
above, an IRS study found that the proportion of criminal tax
convictions positively influences taxpayer reporting of income,
although that effect is somewhat reduced by increased reporting of
offsets, such as credits.242
With respect to monetary sanctions, studies sometimes find a
positive effect,243 but they generally do not find as strong an effect
of fines as they do of audit threats,244 or they do not get statistically

238. Id. at 334–37.
239. See Jon S. Davis et al., Social Behaviors, Enforcement, and Tax Compliance Dynamics,

78 ACCT. REV. 39 (2003) (modeling this approach); Lederman, supra note 70 (arguing that this
is what happens in the tax compliance context).
240. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
241. Because punishment is costly, the cost of punishment could outweigh the gains to
the group from increased cooperation. Simon Gächter et al., The Long-Run Benefits of Punishment, 322 SCI. 1510, 1510 (2008). However, punishment generally increases cooperation over
time and thus reduces the use of punishment. Gächter et al. conducted experiments
involving games with punishment available and without a punishment option. They found
higher average contributions in the punishment-option games, and they also found greater
benefits of punishment in a fifty-round game than in a ten-round game. Id.
242. See Plumley, supra note 155, at 36.
243. See Alm, supra note 180, at 756 (“A higher fine rate leads to marginally more
compliance, with an estimated reported income-fine rate elasticity less than 0.1.”); cf. Robert
Mason & Lyle D. Calvin, Public Confidence and Admitted Tax Evasion, 37 NAT’L TAX J. 489, 493
(2001) (finding from a survey of Oregon taxpayers that “[s]anction fear . . . is strongly related
to compliance and suggests that the dissatisfied honest do not engage in tax fraud because
they are afraid of getting caught”); Michael W. Spicer, Civilization at a Discount: The Problem
of Tax Evasion, 39 NAT’L TAX J. 13, 15 (1986) (“Survey studies indicate that the incidence of
tax evasion is inversely related to the fear of sanctions . . . .”).
244. See Boris Maciejovsky et al., Misperception of Chance and Loss Repair: On the
Dynamics of Tax Compliance, 28 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 678, 684 (2007) (finding, in a lab experiment
in Vienna, that “[e]ffect sizes suggest that audits have a stronger impact on compliance than
fines”). The details of this experiment are discussed further below. See infra notes 270–280
and accompanying text.
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significant results. 245 For example, a laboratory experiment
conducted in the United States found that the severity of the fine
(either twice or six times the evaded amount) had no effect on
compliance.246 “[I]n fact, tax evasion is less with a two-times-fine
rate with a three in six audit probability than a six-times-fine rate
with a one in six audit probability.”247 Another U.S. lab experiment
found that “[c]ompliance increases with an increase in the fine rate;
however, the coefficient on FINERATE is so small that the fine rate
elasticity is virtually zero, and the coefficient is also not
highly significant.”248
Why might sanctions have a small effect? The authors of the
latter study, Jim Alm, Betty R. Jackson, and Michael McKee, explain
that “[s]ince the probability of detection is small, large responses to
changes in the fine rate would require extreme degrees of risk
aversion.”249 Thus, a large fine may be little deterrent if there is little
likelihood it will be imposed.
Alm, Jackson, and McKee note that “[a] policy implication is
that increasing penalties may not have a noticeable effect on
compliance, unless the probability of detection is increased
significantly.”250 A study in Washington State on reporting

245. See, e.g., Arial, supra note 163, at 43–52 (finding no statistically significant effect on
corporate taxpayers of a letter “inform[ing] taxpayers that filing a false report will result in
harsh sanctions”). The text of the letter is not included but is described. See id. at 43 (“The
fact that tax noncompliance is a grave matter was emphasized more than once. . . . The types
of available modes of punishment were highlighted. . . . Moreover, the letter informed the
participant that the tax authority now uses new methods of auditing taxpayers. . . . [which]
was intended to increase the perceived probability of detection and apprehension.”).
246. Paul Webley, Audit Probabilities and Tax Evasion in a Business Simulation, 25 ECON.
LETTERS 267, 270 (1987).
247. Id.; see also Maciejovsky et al., supra 244, at 684 (“Effect sizes suggest that audits
have a stronger impact on compliance than fines.”). But cf. Nehemiah Friedland et al., A
Simulation Study of Income Tax Evasion, 10 J. P UB. ECON. 107, 110–11 (1978) (finding in study
of fifteen Israeli undergraduates that increasing the fine rate from three times to fifteen times
the amount evaded was a more effective deterrent than increasing the audit rate from one
out of fifteen to five out of fifteen).
248. James Alm et al., Estimating the Determinants of Taxpayer Compliance with
Experimental Data, 45 NAT’L TAX J. 107, 110 (1992).
249. Id. See also Chirico et al., supra note 163, at 150, 154 fig.2 (finding that a threat of
seizure or sale of property written in large type resulted in positive effects, but they were
small and statistically insignificant).
250. Alm et al., supra note 248, at 110.
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compliance supports this suggestion.251 The study examined the
effects of “increasing sanction awareness and threats of enhanced
detection risk” on payments by construction businesses of (1) an
excise tax on gross revenues called the Business and Occupation
(B&O) tax and (2) “use taxes” due on items purchased out of state
but used in state.252 The study found that receipt of either a
“sanction-awareness” or “detection” letter253 was associated with
increased reporting of the base subject to use tax,254 the effect they
studied because of differences in applicable tax rates.255 However,
for both taxes, the penalty letter resulted in only marginally
significant effects without a manipulation of detection likelihood.256
Overall, these studies suggest that audit threats are much more
effective than sanction threats at increasing compliance. The
general effectiveness of audit threats supports the notion that
deterrence has positive rather than negative effects, as does the
IRS’s data on the indirect effects of audits and the deterrent effect
of criminal tax prosecutions.257 However, although these overall
effects are important, they do not isolate the effects of audit on the
251. Govind Iyer et al., Increasing Tax Compliance in Washington State: A Field Experiment,
63 NAT’L TAX J. 7 (2010).
252. Id. at 7–10 (parentheticals omitted) (“The use tax noncompliance rate is estimated
at 18.1 percent while the B&O tax noncompliance rate is estimated at 2.2 percent.”).
253. The detection letter “explained that the DOR was trying to improve compliance
with tax laws by examining tax returns to assess use tax underpayments. The detection
manipulation also informed firms that the DOR required them to provide a detailed report
of assets purchased and that these reports should be consistent with their Federal
Depreciation Schedule . . . .” Id. at 14.
254. Id. at 21. “[W]hen penalty information is communicated to the taxpayers
(penalty/no detection scenario), the reported use tax base increases to 8.97 (significant at . . .
p = 0.07).” Id. at 22. They also found “a significant effect for the Penalty*Detection variable
(. . . p = 0.01).” Id. at 21.
255. Id. at 16. The study also found a modest spillover of the detection letter onto
compliance with B&O taxes. Id. at 29.
256. Id. at 29. More specifically:
When the taxpayers are asked to provide federal tax information (detection/no
penalty scenario), the reported [logarithmic] use tax base variable increases [from
8.42] to 9.28 (significant at . . . p = 0.004). Likewise, when penalty information is
communicated to the taxpayers (penalty/no detection scenario), the reported use
tax base increases to 8.97 (significant at . . . p = 0.07).
Id. at 21–22; see also id. at 29 (“Penalty information [for B&O tax] is, as in the case of use tax,
marginally significant in the absence of detection manipulation.”); id. at 22 (in use tax
penalty/no detection manipulation, p was 0.07).
257. See Plumley, supra note 155; see also supra note 155 and accompanying text; supra
notes 180–182 and accompanying text.
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audited taxpayers themselves. That issue is discussed in the
next Part.
III. POST-AUDIT REDUCTION OF COMPLIANT BEHAVIOR
It is possible that the audit itself affects taxpayer reporting
behavior in a way that audit threats or audits of others do not.
Audited taxpayers’ subsequent reporting behavior may also differ
depending on aspects of the audit experience, such as whether the
audit was random or not; whether the taxpayer was found
undercompliant, fully compliant, or overcompliant in the audit;
whether the taxpayer was required to pay a fine; and whether the
taxpayer was subject to repeated audits. Several studies have
examined the effect of audits on the future reporting behavior of
those audited.258 The next section discusses laboratory experiments,
and the following section discusses field experiments.
A. The “Bomb-Crater Effect” in Laboratory Experiments
Several laboratory experiments have examined the effects of
audits on post-audit compliance behavior. These experiments are
structured such that participants retaining more lab dollars net of
“taxes” are paid more for participating.259 One of the earliest tested
eight different conditions, each with sixty rounds.260 Each
participant, an economics student from the University of Trento,261

258. See, e.g., Brian Erard, The Influence of Tax Audits on Reporting Behavior, in WHY
PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 95, 113 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992)
(studying the effects of IRS audits on subsequent-year reporting and reaching inconclusive
results); id. at 97–98 (reporting the results of a study finding that taxpayers experiencing a
random research audit of their 1969 returns were slightly less likely to be found
noncompliant on their 1971 returns, but the magnitude of noncompliance was unaffected)
(citing Susan B. Long & Richard D. Schwartz, The Impact of IRS Audits on Taxpayer
Compliance: A Field Experiment in Specific Deterrence, Paper Presented at the Annual Law
and Society Association Meeting (1987)); infra Part III.B (discussing other studies); see also
supra text accompanying notes 211–214 (noting Minnesota Tax Compliance Experiment’s
finding that the audit letter had a positive effect on individuals who had had their prior
year’s taxes adjusted but a negative effect on those who had paid a penalty that prior year).
259. See, e.g., Luigi Mittone, Dynamic Behavior in Tax Evasion: An Experimental Approach,
35 J. SOCIO-ECON. 813, 814 (2006).
260. Id. at 816–18. One can think of those sixty rounds as corresponding to sixty years’
worth of tax filing in the life of an individual.
261. Students typically have little taxpaying experience. A recent study in the United
Kingdom conducted a taxpaying experiment on 200 students, 200 individuals who work as
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was assigned an amount of gross income in a round, told the
amount of taxes due, and notified with a pop-up window each time
the audit probability for the next three rounds changed.262 The
experimenter, Luigi Mittone, randomly determined the audited
rounds in advance.263 However, each audit entailed an audit of that
round plus the previous three rounds.264 Mittone tested the effect
of several factors, such as informing the participants that the taxes
collected would be contributed to a scholarship fund.265
Mittone found, in part, that “the number of evaders was
noticeably lower in the experiments with redistribution . . . and
with a public good . . . than it was in those with no moral
constraint . . . .”266 In addition, he found the striking pattern that
“there is a sort of constancy in the rounds immediately after a fiscal
audit, which is almost always followed by a systematic increase in
tax evasion.”267 He termed this the “bomb crater effect.”268 This

employees and have their income fully reported by the employer and do not have to file a
tax return, and 120 self-employed individuals who are required to file returns. C.Y. Lawrence
Choo et al., Do Students Behave Like Real Taxpayers in the Lab? Evidence from a Real Effort Tax
Compliance Experiment, 214 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 102, 103 (2016). It found that, in the lowfine treatments, students were the least compliant (p = 0.069). Id. at 108.
262. Mittone, supra note 259, at 819. The income assigned to participants ranged from
0.36 Euro cents to 0.51 Euro cents in different rounds. The tax rate was 20, 30, or 40% in each
round. The penalty for evasion was 4.5 times the evaded taxes. Id. at 818.
263. Id. at 819 (“rounds 13, 31, 34, 48, 54, 58 for the first group, and rounds 3, 24, 27, 40,
46, 50 for the second group. . . .”).
264. Id. at 818.
265. Id. at 820.
266. Id. at 821.
267. Id. at 823.
268. Id. at 824. The term comes from the reported tendency of soldiers in World War I
to shelter in bomb craters because they believed a bomb was unlikely to fall twice in the same
place. Id. at 824 n.9. This 2006 article seems to use the term “bomb crater effect” as referring
to a decline in compliance after an audit that occurs because participants think it’s unlikely
they’ll experience another audit right away; it states, “This shall be called the ‘bomb crater
effect’ (BCE): the subjects decide to evade immediately after a fiscal audit because they
believe that it cannot happen twice in the same place (time).” Id. at 823–24 (footnote omitted).
Subsequently, Maciejovsky explored the possibility that “loss repair” explains the
observed decline in compliance. See Maciejovsky et al., supra note 244, at 679. In a 2017 article
Mittone coauthored, the Abstract states, “The experimental literature has identified the
Bomb Crater Effect (BoCE), i.e., the fact that tax compliance drops immediately after a
taxpayer is audited. From a theoretical perspective, BoCE has been explained either by the
misperception of chance, also known as the gambler’s fallacy, or by the loss repair effect.”
Luigi Mittone et al., The Bomb-Crater Effect of Tax Audits: Beyond the Misperception of Chance,
61 J. ECON. PSYCH. 225, 225 (2017). This Article uses the term in that later sense, as simply
describing an observed decline in compliance, without referring to a possible cause.
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effect, in terms of the median percentage of tax paid, was highly
statistically significant.269
A study published the following year attempted to distinguish
between two possible explanations of the bomb-crater effect:
misperceived chance and recouping of audit losses.270 Maciejovsky
et al. recruited students in Vienna for two lab experiments. In the
first experiment, participants earned income by buying or selling
assets in a competitive market. “After each trading period,
participants were asked to declare their earnings, separately for
sales revenues, resulting from selling assets, and for dividends paid
for holding assets.”271 Audit probabilities were 15% in one
treatment and 30% in the other, and the penalty for evasion was
50% or 100% of the omitted income.272 Maciejovsky et al. found that
tax compliance was generally higher in the high-audit treatment
than in the low-audit treatment.273 In addition:
[C]ompliance decreased sharply after an audit and increased
slowly in the next three consecutive trading periods in the highaudit condition. In the low-audit condition compliance decreased
after an audit steadily. . . . It might well be that observing more
than four subsequent filing periods would reveal an increase of
compliance rates also in the low-audit condition. However, our
design did not allow for such an analysis. These results suggest
that participants’ compliance decisions are driven by
misconception of the audit probability, as shown in the literature
on gambler’s fallacy.274

In their second experiment, Maciejovsky et al. focused on
whether the participants truly believed the audits were random.275
Accordingly, one of the participants rolled a six-sided die, and all
participants were audited if the roll was a one or a two, yielding a
one-third chance of audit.276 Participants were also assigned an
income amount; the tax rate was 40%, and the penalty was 50% of
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Mittone, supra note 259, at 825 (p = 0.0000).
Maciejovsky et al., supra note 244, at 679.
Id. at 682.
Id.
Id. at 684.
Id.
Id. at 685–86.
Id. at 686.
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undeclared income.277 This experiment also found a bombcrater effect.278
To test whether the bomb-crater effect was driven by loss
recoupment, the authors examined the effects audits had on
compliant versus noncompliant participants, presumably because
noncompliant/penalized participants have greater losses to recoup
after audit.279 They found no differences.280 Accordingly, because
they had posited only one alternative explanation—misperceived
chance—they concluded that misperceived chance drove the
bomb-crater effect.
A subsequent lab experiment by Barbara Kastlunger et al.
investigated the effects on compliance of various patterns of
repeated audits.281 One of the effects they examined was the bombcrater effect, looking at whether it could better be explained by
misperceived chance or loss recoupment.282 Participants were given
1000 Experimental Currency Units in each of sixty rounds and told
that the tax rate was 20%, the audit rate was 15%, and the fine for
evasion was three times the unpaid tax (in addition to the unpaid
tax). Each participant was audited nine times. In the control
condition, the audits were randomly distributed over the sixty
rounds. Experimental condition 1 (E1) experienced audits in all
three of the first three rounds, with the remaining six audits in the
rest of the first twenty rounds.283 Experimental condition 2 (E2) had
all of the audits concentrated between rounds 20 through 39, so

277. Id. at 686–87. “The exact amount [of income assigned] was randomly drawn from
a uniform distribution ranging from 80 ECU [Experimental Currency Units] to 120 ECU,
whereby 100 ECU was equivalent to 10 Euro.” Id. at 686.
278. Id. at 688. (“The average compliance rate dropped from 0.63 in the period of an
audit to 0.56 immediately after an audit (t(49)=2.51; p<0.05; d=0.72).”). Maciejovsky et al. also
found that the return to baseline compliance after an audit was a quadratic function. Id.
279. Id. (“Loss repair can be detected if the drop of compliance for the dishonest
taxpayers is significantly more pronounced than the corresponding drop for the
honest taxpayers.”).
280. Id.
281. Barbara Kastlunger et al., Sequences of Audits, Tax Compliance, and Taxpaying
Strategies, 30 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 405, 405, 408 (2009) (studying economics students at the
University of Trento).
282. Id. at 409.
283. Id. at 408. The only consecutive audits after that were in rounds 9 and 10. Id.
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there were no audits at the beginning or end of the sixty rounds.284
Experimental condition 3 (E3) had all of its audits in the first twenty
rounds, but all audits were in even rounds (round 2, round 4, round
6, etc., through round 18).285
Overall, Kastlunger et al. found that both previous tax
payments and fines had a slight positive effect on compliance in the
next round, and audits had a substantial negative effect, with all of
these effects significant at p < 0.01.286 Although a bomb-crater effect
existed for the control group (random audits), and for condition E3
(the fairly transparent alternating audits), conditions E1 and E2
lacked that effect. Instead, audits positively predicted compliance.287 Accordingly, Kastlunger et al. determined that consecutive
audits counter the bomb-crater effect.288
This suggested to them that misperceived chance causes bomb
craters. Accordingly, like Maciejovsky, they disaggregated the
effects of audits on compliant and noncompliant taxpayers in the
control group.289 They found,
[f]ocusing on compliant cases in t0 [the audit round], in 52.7% of
compliant audited cases tax payments were reduced to some
extent in t1 [the post-audit round] (21.8%) or participants evaded
completely (30.9%) in t1. By contrast, only in 36.9% of noncompliant cases at t0 participants reduced their tax payments
(9.4%) or evaded completely (27.5%) at t1; whereas, 19.4% of the
non-compliant cases showed increased or total compliance after
the audit.290

284. Id. (“[T]here were three audits right at the beginning, whereas the remaining
audits were positioned between rounds 23 and 39, with two further continuous audits after
rounds 28 and 29.”).
285. Id.
286. Id. at 409, 412 tbl.2. For an explanation of p-values, see Darrow, supra note 48.
287. Kastlunger et al., supra note 281, at 409, 410 fig.1.
288. Id. at 409.
289. Id. (“If loss-repair accounts for the bomb crater effect, only participants who were
fined in the audit round (t0) should increase evasion in the following round (t1), whereas
compliant participants should tend to remain compliant.”). Compliant taxpayers could
actually try to recoup the loss of the tax paid, but they would have less to recoup from that
round than taxpayers who paid the tax plus a penalty.
290. Id.; see also id. at 412 tbl.3.
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They concluded from this that their results “do not confirm lossrepair tendencies but suggest misperception of chance.”291
It is true that those results do not confirm loss repair; audited
noncompliant taxpayers did not increase their evasion more than
the audited compliant. However, if the bomb-crater mechanism is
misperception of the chance of audit, one would expect differences
in compliant and noncompliant taxpayers’ post-audit behavior to
result only by chance. Here, the compliant taxpayers showed the
greater bomb-crater effect. Kastlunger et al. do not report whether
the differences are statistically significant.292 If they are, it would
support a distinct effect of audit on compliant taxpayers, an issue
discussed in the next section.
Also, what is the actual chance of audit that participants may
have misperceived? They were told that the audit rate was 15%.
And in each condition, nine out of sixty rounds were audited, so
each participant was audited nine times. This is not the same as
rolling a die, however, where each roll is independent and has the
same odds. When rolling a die that has a 15% chance of prompting
an audit, participants might perceive that the likelihood of audit
diminishes with each audit and even reaches zero after nine audits.
That would be incorrect. But here, participants who hold those
beliefs would actually correctly perceive the audit likelihood.
Kastlunger et al. also found that tax payments decreased after
participants had not been audited for ten rounds and continued to
decrease until the experiment ended.293 In order to investigate
whether a single later audit after a longer period without audits
would restore compliance to the previous levels, they conducted a
second experiment, with two conditions. The first condition (E1*)
was like E1 except that the audit in round 3 was moved to round
31. The second condition (E2*) followed the same pattern of audits

291. Id. at 409. Kastlunger et al. also found for noncompliant participants who
decreased their tax payments the round after audit, “[t]he correlation between experienced
fines and compliance at t1 was highly significant with r = –.47, p < .01, n = 59, indicating that
detection and punishment of non-compliance led to lower compliance in the following
round.” Id. at 411–12.
292. See id. at 409, 412 tbl.3.
293. Id. at 413.
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(two consecutive audits, an audit five rounds later, etc.), except
with the first audit in round 20, so the last audit was in round 51.294
The authors found that “[t]he average payments per round, as
well as the sum of honest tax filings, did not differ between the two
conditions and were similar to Study 1.”295 Audits had no
significant effect on compliance in E1* but had a positive influence
in E2*. The authors concluded that two consecutive audits may
suppress bomb craters and that one audit during a compliance
decrease may suffice to increase it.296 Thus, Kastlunger et al.’s focus
was on the timing of audits, rather than on the post-audit behavior
of compliant and noncompliant taxpayers.
Those studies used random or predetermined audits. By
contrast, a lab experiment by James Alm and Jim McKee examined
the effect on compliance of an endogenous audit rule that
compared the individual’s compliance level to that of others.297
Although that study’s focus was on whether participants could
coordinate on a zero-compliance equilibrium, it included a dummy
variable for whether the participant was audited in the previous
round, and found a negative correlation between that and
compliance.298 The authors explained that because the audit rule
called for auditing the least-compliant participant in that round,
decreasing compliance “is a best response strategy if the individual
expects others to lower their compliance because they were not
audited in the previous round.”299 That study did not disaggregate
compliant participants, so it is unclear if a particular subset of
participants was driving that effect.
A more recent study used a different endogenous-audit rule to
test whether such an audit rule eliminated bomb craters.300 Emily
Satterthwaite used Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (an online

294.
295.
296.
297.

Id. at 413–14.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 415, 416.
James Alm & Jim McKee, Tax Compliance as a Coordination Game, 54 J. ECON. BEHAV.
& ORG. 297 (2004).
298. See id. at 309 tbl.3, 310 (not stating whether that effect was statistically significant).
299. Id. at 310.
300. See Emily Ann Satterthwaite, Can Audits Encourage Tax Evasion?: An Experimental
Assessment, 20 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (2016).
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marketplace for workers)301 to recruit mostly non-student U.S.
participants. The study involved a random audit (the control) and
an endogenous audit in which likelihood of audit was determined
by whether the previous audit found the taxpayer noncompliant
(the treatment).302
Each condition had sixty rounds, although participants were
told the study would last at least sixty-two rounds, so as to avoid a
“last period” effect. In each round, participants were endowed with
$800 to $1200 of “extra income” on which taxes were due. The tax
rate was 30%, the average audit probability (over all participants)
was 10%, and the penalty was 100% of unpaid taxes (plus the
unpaid taxes).303 Participants in the treatment group were told,
“Audits occur with a probability of 10 percent. If you do not report
all of your income, and you are chosen for audit, your unreported
income will be detected with certainty. Moreover, you will be
‘flagged’ for audit in subsequent periods.”304
Satterthwaite found that average compliance rates in the
treatment group were higher, in every period, than under the
random-audit rule.305 In both conditions, compliance decreased

301. See AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome
(last visited Oct. 16, 2018).
302. Satterthwaite, supra note 300, at 9. Random audits were scattered throughout the
experiment. Id. In the treatment group, if the random audit showed full reporting, the
participant remained subject to random audit. If the random audit showed cheating, that
participant was audited again in the next period. Id. A participant ceased to be subject to
random audits after being audited six times. Id.
303. Id. at 45.
304. Id. at 47. The details of the “flagging” were not disclosed to participants but were
as follows:
[1.] [I]f the initial audit reveals that she reported all her income truthfully, she will
be returned to the random IID [independent and identically distributed] audit
lottery.
[2.] If the initial audit reveals underreported income, she will be audited again in
the immediately succeeding period.
[3.] If the repeat audit reveals evasion, there is another repeat audit. This
conditional audit process continues until the participant has reached the cap of six
audits. After the sixth audit, the participant faces no more audits . . . .
[4.] Note that, following any audit other than the sixth, where an audit reveals
truthful reporting, the participant is returned to the pool of participants selected
for audit through the ten percent IID random process.
Id. at 48.
305. Id. at 54.
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over time, although somewhat more so under random audits.306
Satterthwaite found evidence of a bomb-crater effect for the control
group, although in the first half of the experiment there were eight
periods in which average post-audit compliance was higher than
average pre-audit compliance.307 For the treatment group, after
about round 10, average post-audit compliance exceeded pre-audit
compliance and in many periods approached or attained perfect
compliance.308 However, in the first half of the experiment, there
were eight periods in which the treatment group, on average,
exhibited a bomb-crater effect.309 She concluded that a known
endogenous-audit rule eliminated a bomb-crater effect following
the first audit.310
Satterthwaite also investigated the effect of consecutive
audits.311 In the control condition, after one random audit,
compliance dropped by almost 10 percentage points. After a second
random audit in a row, compliance increased by approximately 7
percentage points. After a third, compliance increased by 12
percentage points, and after four random audits in a row, it
increased by about 2 percentage points and began to plateau.312 By
contrast, the treatment condition, in which participants had been
told that detected cheating would be a flag for audit, did not begin
with a bomb crater. 313 Instead, after the first audit, compliance rose
by 5 percentage points. After a second consecutive audit,
compliance decreased by approximately 2 percentage points.314
After a third consecutive audit, compliance increased by almost 7
percentage points, and after the fourth audit in a row, it decreased
slightly.315 Thus, in the endogenous audit treatment, Satterthwaite

306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

Id.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 56.
Id.
Id. at 63.
In the control group, even a compliant taxpayer could experience consecutive
audits. In the treatment group, a compliant taxpayer could also be selected at random for a
consecutive audit.
312. Satterthwaite, supra note 300, at 61.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
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found an increase in compliance after the first audit but alternating
effects for subsequent audits.316
Satterthwaite’s results provide support for presenting audits as
non-random. They may provide some support for repeated audits,
as does the Kastlunger et al. study discussed above317 and the
DeBacker et al. study of IRS (non-random) audits of corporate
taxpayers.318 However, it is hard to know what is driving the alternating increases and decreases in compliance in Satterthwaite’s
endogenous audit group.319
Professor Satterthwaite’s experiment initially did not separate
out compliant from noncompliant taxpayers, and her published
article does not report any results relating to those subgroups.
However, she conducted a basic subgroup analysis in response to
my inquiry. Specifically, for each of the audit conditions, she
calculated average compliance in round t1 (the post-audit round) of
four groups: (1) those audited in round t0 who were compliant in
that round, (2) those audited in round t0 who were not compliant in
that round, (3) those not audited in round t0 who were compliant in
that round, and (4) those not audited in round t0 who were not
compliant in that round.320
When Professor Satterthwaite compared the two subgroups in
the random audit condition who were compliant in round t0, she
found less than 100% compliance in round t1 for both of those
subgroups. The subgroup that had not been audited in round t0 had

316. Id. Repeated audits may have various effects. For example, a lab experiment found
that “the number of audits had a significant and negative effect on tax evasion in the last
round.” Michael W. Spicer & Rodney E. Hero, Tax Evasion and Heuristics: A Research Note, 26
J. PUB. ECON. 263, 266 (1985) (p < 0.02).
317. See supra text accompanying note 296.
318. See DeBacker et al., supra note 216, at 311 (“These results imply that firms are much
less tax aggressive after a second audit than they are after the first audit, which suggests that
they have revised their audit probability upward.”).
319. In part, that may be regression to the mean. See Susan B. Long, Commentary on
Brian Erard, The Influence of Tax Audits on Reporting Behavior, in W HY PEOPLE PAY TAXES:
TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 115, 119 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (stating with respect
to a 1992 study, “[h]ad Erard selected taxpayers whose initial audit results were ‘extreme’ in
the opposite direction (taxpayers initially highly compliant), he would have doubtless found
a similar regression toward the mean with these taxpayers becoming less compliant after
their initial audit”); cf. Erard, supra note 258, at 100–01 (acknowledging that point).
320. See Email from Emily Satterthwaite, Professor, Univ. of Toronto, to author (Dec.
19, 2017) (on file with author).
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an average compliance rate of 0.929 in round t1. This decrease from
100% compliance despite the lack of audit suggests that regression
to the mean explains at least part of the post-audit decline in
compliance.321 The average compliance among these two subgroups of compliant taxpayers was lower for those who were
audited, however, with the audited subgroup having an average
compliance rate of 0.820, suggesting that the audit had a
negative effect.322
In Satterthwaite’s endogenous audit condition, the same
pattern occurred, but the difference between the round t1
compliance rates was smaller: an average compliance rate of 0.940
for the not-audited who were compliant in round t0 and an average
of 0.915 for the audited who were compliant in round t0.323 The
greater decline in compliance in round t1 by those audited in round
t0 compared to those not audited in round t0 also suggests that
experiencing an audit has a negative effect on next-round
compliance. Thus, Satterthwaite’s findings in this regard are
consistent with other laboratory experiments that found a bombcrater effect immediately after audit.
B. Field Experiments on Post-Audit Compliance
The laboratory experiments discussed above generally focus on
the effects of audits on all audited participants. By contrast, field
experiments have raised the prospect of a post-audit decline in
compliance only of the subgroup of individual taxpayers found
compliant on audit.324 First, a U.K. field experiment examined the
effects of audits on three categories of unincorporated taxpayers:
medium businesses, small businesses, and personal taxpayers.325
321.
322.
323.
324.

See supra note 319; infra text accompanying notes 396–403.
See Email from Emily Satterthwaite, supra note 320.
Id.
See, e.g., Marcelo Bergman & Armando Nevarez, Do Audits Enhance Compliance?
An Empirical Assessment of VAT Enforcement, 59 NAT’L TAX J. 817, 821, 825 (2006) (examining
the effects of audits on VAT compliance in Chile and Argentina).
325. Norman Gemmell & Marisa Ratto, Behavioral Responses to Taxpayer Audits: Evidence
from Random Taxpayer Inquiries, 65 NAT’L TAX J. 33, 41 (2012) (“[T]hough the M- and Ssegments may be thought to be similar, many small businesses—those with a turnover of
less than £15,000—are akin to personal taxpayers with some self-employment income.”).
“Each segment consists of around 2,500–3,000 individuals, of which around 20–25 percent
were audited.” Id. at 43.
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The study’s authors, Norman Gemmell and Marisa Ratto,
compared taxpayers randomly audited in 2000 with taxpayers who
were not and looked at tax reported by these taxpayers for the three
years before and after 2000.326 Overall, the study found no
statistically significant effects of the audit, before separating out
subgroups of taxpayers.327 Gemmell and Ratto then looked separately at the medium businesses, small businesses, and personal
taxpayers and divided them into “compliant” and “noncompliant”
based on the audit results.328
The study found a positive effect of audits on the tax reported
by taxpayers found noncompliant but a negative effect on the tax
reported by taxpayers found compliant.329 As far as the magnitude
of a possible negative effect of audit on subsequent compliance,
Gemmell and Ratto explain that “for Personal taxpayers identified
as compliant, declared tax fell due to audit by about 7 percent on
average over 2001–2003.”330 The effects on small and medium
businesses were larger (11% and 17%, respectively), but with larger
margins of error.331 The positive effects of audits on taxpayers
whose returns were adjusted were generally of greater magnitude:
5%, 24%, and 18% for personal taxpayers, small businesses,
and medium business respectively.332 Gemmell and Ratto
hypothesized that the stronger compliance response by businesses
than by personal taxpayers reflects their greater opportunity to
evade taxes.333
326. Id. at 42. They state: “To minimize the likelihood that previous or future audits
influence observed reactions to the 2000 audit, we excluded all taxpayers who were audited
in these six years (1997–1999, 2001–2003).” Id. at 41. Looking at years prior to the audit should
help give a more complete picture of a taxpayer’s overall compliance level.
327. Id. at 47; cf. Bergman & Nevarez, supra note 324, at 821 (finding in Chile and
Argentina that, overall, audits had no effect on compliance).
328. Gemmell & Ratto, supra note 325, at 42. Of the 2006 audited taxpayers, they found
1342 (66.9%) compliant and 664 (33.1%) noncompliant. See id. at 42 tbl.2. The control group
contained 6420 unaudited taxpayers. See id.
329. Id. at 48 (“In all cases positive parameters are obtained for the noncompliant group
and negative parameters are obtained for the compliant group.”). The authors recognize and
control for the fact that although the audited group and control group are selected randomly,
the subgroups of audited compliant and audited noncompliant are not. Id. at 45–46. They do
not have subgroups of unaudited compliant and noncompliant. See id.
330. Id. at 50.
331. Id. at 49 tbl.5.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 55.
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In this study, only some of the effects were statistically
significant, however. For example, in the “Before/after 2000”
regression, for those found compliant, while the coefficient for
personal taxpayers was significant at p < 0.05, the coefficient for
medium businesses was not significant, and the one for small
businesses was significant only at p < 0.10.334 Gemmell and Ratto
explain that “[u]nsurprisingly perhaps, the negative preventive
effects for the compliant are less robustly estimated for medium
businesses where they are a smaller fraction of the audited.”335
Overall, they concluded that any negative effect of random audits
on noncompliant taxpayers should be weighed against the
beneficial indirect effects of these audits.336
In the United States, DeBacker et al. used IRS data to study the
effects of random audits on individuals’ tax compliance.337 They
examined data from years 2006, 2008, and 2009 of the IRS National
Research Program,338 which runs the random audits the IRS
conducts to update the formula it uses to score returns on their
likelihood of noncompliance. This was a much larger study than
Gemmell and Ratto’s, with billions of observations.339 Overall,
DeBacker et al. found that audits had positive effects: they

334. Id. at 47 tbl.4. The other specification was “Before 2000/after inquiry closure.” Id.
In that regression, the coefficients for compliant personal taxpayers and medium businesses
were significant at p < 0.01, and the coefficient for compliant small businesses was not
statistically significant. Id.
335. Id. at 48.
336. Id. at 53, 55.
337. Jason DeBacker et al., Once Bitten, Twice Shy? The Lasting Impact of IRS Audits
on Individual Tax Reporting 1 (Jan. 16, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
the author).
338. Id. at 10.
339. Id. at 35 tbl.1 (reporting 4.36 billion observations for the NRP sample and
4.33 billion observations for the random sample). For the NRP sample, DeBacker et al. report
404,252,738 observations in the base (NRP-audit) year, of which 164,338,287 had a positive
adjustment to tax liability and 29,778,483 had a negative adjustment. Id. There were
210,135,968 no-change returns, comprising 51.98% of the total. Id. This contrasts with general
data reported by the IRS, which for 2015 shows an overall no-change rate for individual
income tax returns of 9% for field audits and 12% for correspondence audits. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SVC., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK, 2015, at 1, 24
tbl.9a (Mar. 2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/15databk.pdf.
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increased reported taxable income, a statistically significant
effect,340 and that increase persisted over time.341
DeBacker et al. also separately examined the effect on reported
taxable income on taxpayers whose random audit resulted in a
positive adjustment, a negative one, or no adjustment.342 They
found that for taxpayers with a positive adjustment, taxable income
increased in the first and second years post-audit, and it stayed
elevated through the final year they reported, year six.343 The
results for that group were statistically significant.344
For taxpayers whose audit resulted in no adjustment either
way, DeBacker et al. found that taxable income declined the first
year post-audit—which is consistent with a bomb-crater effect—
increased to the audit-year level in the second year post-audit,
gradually increased through year four, then declined slightly in the
fifth and sixth years, ending a bit above where it started.345
However, in contrast to the results for taxpayers whose
returns had been adjusted, these results generally were not
statistically significant.346
340. DeBacker et al., supra note 337, at 18–19 (“[A]udits increase reported taxable
income by $1,109, which is statistically significant at the 1% level.”); see also id. at 30–31 (“The
results from a simple difference-in-differences specification indicate that an audit increases
reported taxable income by more than $1,100 per year, equivalent to 2.9% of the
average income.”).
341. Id. at 17 (“Reported taxable income increases in the first and second years after an
audit and remains elevated even after six years. Adjusted gross income (AGI) and wage
income follow a similar pattern to that of taxable income.”).
342. Id. at 45 fig.4.
343. Id. (showing progressive increases in the first and second years post-audit, a
gradual decline in years three through five to about the level of the first post-audit year, and
a leveling off in year six).
344. Id. at 19 (“We see the strongest and most statistically significant response from the
group with positive adjustments. Almost all the coefficients for the other two groups are
statistically insignificant and have much lower point estimates than for the positive
adjustment group.”).
345. Id. at 45 fig.4. The figure shows “Change in Reported Taxable Income,” which is
thus 0 in the year of audit. In the first post-audit year, the change in this group relative to the
audit year is about -650; in the second, close to 0; in the third, about 450; in the fourth, about
650; in the fifth, about 600; and in the sixth, about 450. See id.
The results for the negative adjustment group (those who were found on audit to have
overcomplied) essentially zigzagged from increase to decrease and back: the change in this
group relative to the year of audit was about 1750 in year 1, a slightly negative figure in year
2, about 800 in year 3, about 1900 in year 4, about -600 in year 5, and about 1100 in year 6.
See id.
346. Id. at 19.
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Another U.S. study using IRS data, and similar in design to the
U.K. study, found a negative effect of audit on taxpayers found
compliant on audit, as the U.K. study did. This U.S. study,
conducted by Sebastian Beer et al., was commissioned by the
National Taxpayer Advocate (NTA), Nina Olson, and analyzed the
forward-looking effects of IRS audits of self-employed taxpayers’
2007 returns.347 The main design difference between the NTA’s
study and the U.K. study was that the audits included in the NTA’s
study were not random; the returns had been selected for audit in
the ordinary course, which generally is based on likelihood
of noncompliance.348
Overall, like Gemmell and Ratto’s UK study, the NTA’s study
found a positive effect of audit on subsequent reporting. First, for
all taxpayers in the sample (compliant or not), taxable income was
20% higher than the control (unaudited) group three years after
audit.349 Second, that effect was more pronounced for the subgroup
of taxpayers who were assessed additional taxes on audit: “[O]ne
year after having undergone enforcement activity, [they] . . . report
approximately 250 percent more in taxable income than taxpayers
in the control group. Three years after the audit, the estimated
differential remains quite high at 120 percent.”350 These
results initially suggest that audits may be most beneficial where

347. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 181, at 67 n.1, 78. The study was conducted
by Sebastian Beer, Matthias Kasper, Erich Kirchler, and Brian Erard. Id. at 67. It compared “a
random sample of 2,204 Schedule C filers with under $200,000 in total positive income who
were audited subsequent to filing their TY 2007 returns with data for a control sample of
4,705 who were not audited . . . .” Id. at 71.
348. The study notes that “the focus of this study is on taxpayers selected through an
ordinary operational audit process. . . . Operational audits tend to be targeted towards tax
returns with a high potential for noncompliance.” Id.
349. Id. at 73. Similarly, a study in Denmark found that audits deter evasion the
following year: “For the full sample, the effect on total net income is 2557 kroner or 30.1 cents
per additional kroner of audit adjustment. The effect on tax liability is 1375 kroner,
corresponding to 41.7 cents per dollar of audit adjustment. These estimates are strongly
significant.” Kleven et al., supra note 126, at 685. That study did not look separately at
taxpayers found compliant on audit. See generally id.
350. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 181, at 72. Like the Gemmell and Ratto
U.K. study, this study does not separate the control group of unaudited taxpayers by
compliant and noncompliant. Id. at 71. The NTA’s study uses “a Matched Difference-inDifferences estimator” to address this problem. Id. at 76.
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they are most needed, at least with respect to U.S. selfemployed taxpayers.351
With respect to taxpayers found compliant (or overcompliant352) on audit, however, like Gemmell and Ratto, the NTA
found a negative effect of audit on subsequent reported taxable
income.353 In only one of the six specifications, the baseline
differences-in-differences regression, was the magnitude of the
decline statistically significant.354 There, three years after audit,
those taxpayers reported 35.8% less in taxable income than the
control group, a difference significant at p < 0.05.355
A lab experiment conducted in the United Kingdom with three
groups of participants (students, employees, and the selfemployed) also found that compliance decreased after audit,
including among compliant participants, although the primary
driver of this effect was the student sample.356 In contrast to these
studies, a study of the effect of audits on VAT compliance in Chile
and Argentina found a negative overall effect of audit and a positive
effect on the audited taxpayers who did not receive an assessment.
In particular, Marcelo Bergman and Armando Nevarez found that,
“[o]n average, the non-audited have better compliance than
audited tax-payers after enforcement.”357 However, in Chile, 38%
of the taxpayers audited had no assessment, and the audit had a

351. The study notes that “we cannot rule out that our estimates are influenced by the
economic downturn in 2008.” Id. at 70.
352. The study does not mention overcompliant taxpayers. Taxpayers with no positive
adjustment (which could include a refund) were labelled as having no tax change. See id. at
71, 72 (“To avoid confusion . . . , we will refer to . . . the subsample that does not receive an
additional recommended tax assessment as the no-tax-change experimental group ‘E-NC,’
rather than as . . . ‘compliant[]’ . . . .”).
353. See id. at 86, tbl.5.
354. See id. (reporting six regressions and specifying statistically significant results at
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels).
355. Id. at 86. The Executive Summary reports that “[t]he [thirty-five percent] difference
is significant at the one percent level.” Id. at 69. This seems to be an error.
356. Choo et al., supra note 261, at 112 (p < 0.001) (“Starting with the case where the
subject was not evading in period t, we observe a negative and highly significant coefficient
on Not Evadeit × Auditedit−1, indicating that expected compliance goes down in the period
subsequent to an audit taking place. . . . In short, we find evidence for the bomb-crater
effect in our experiment, but that effect is driven primarily by the student sample.”
(citations omitted)).
357. Bergman & Nevarez, supra note 324, at 821.
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positive effect on that group.358 (The authors were unable to
conduct the same analysis for Argentina, where only 2% of the
taxpayers did not receive assessments on audit.359)
It is possible that a country in which noncompliance is high may
result in different taxpayer behavior.360 However, the recent study
in Italy361 by Mazzolini et al. also found similar results to those of
the NTA and Gemmel and Ratto. Mazzolini et al. studied audits of
self-employed taxpayers in the ordinary course. They found that
“[r]eported income increases on average by approximately
8.2 percent after audits”362 and remains higher for three years after
audit.363 Like the NTA, they found a negative effect on the
subgroup of compliant taxpayers for the year after audit.364
However, that result was statistically insignificant.365
Mazzolini et al. find the result with respect to compliant
taxpayers expected366 and “consistent with the predictions of the

358. Id. at 826, 829. At the beginning of the article, the authors state that in Chile,
“approximately 22 percent of VAT fails to be collected, while in neighboring Argentina tax
evasion is roughly double.” Id. at 817–18. However, they do not consider taxpayers who were
not assessed on audit necessarily compliant; they state, “We assume that there is no perfect
compliance. It appears that most taxpayers cheat; however, the difference is in the size of
noncompliance. Those who were not sanctioned appear to be small–scale cheaters.” Id. at
824 n.14.
359. Id. at 826. The percentage was so high in part because audits were not random. See
id. at 820.
360. Id. at 829–30 (“[U]nder the noncompliance equilibrium (as in Argentina),
enforcement fails to enhance specific deterrence and very likely fails to achieve general
deterrence as well.”).
361. “Italy is known to be a country with low tax morale, where tax amnesties are
frequent and institutions (including the tax administration) are relatively less efficient than
those operating in other developed countries.” Mazzolini et al., supra note 215, at 30.
362. Id. at 7.
363. Id. at 22. Similarly, a study of Armenia found that “[f]ollowing an audit, firms
respond by increasing reported income (sub-figure 13a). The magnitude of this response
amounts to an average increase of 9, 17 and 7 percent in the first three years of audit,
respectively, compared to the pre-audit year.” Zareh Asatryan & Andreas Peichl, Responses
of Firms to Tax, Administrative and Accounting Rules: Evidence from Armenia 30–31 (CESifo,
Working Paper No. 6754, Nov. 2017), https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_6754.html.
However, “every additional dollar of reported income in years t to t+1 is, on average,
matched by a 0.90 dollar increase in reported deductions.” Id. at 31. This result is consistent
with Carrillo et al., Dodging the Taxman: Firm Misreporting and Limits to Tax Enforcement, 9 AM.
ECON. J. APPLIED ECON. 144 (2016). See id. at 146 (“[F]irms increased reported costs by 96 cents
for every dollar of revenue adjustment.”).
364. Mazzolini et al., supra note 215, at 23.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 6–7.
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standard [(deterrence)] model of tax compliance.”367 They explain
that, in a no-change audit, “we expect a downward revision of the
probability assigned by the cheating taxpayer to the success of tax
inspectors in discovering evasion.”368 In other words, before the
audit, the average taxpayer likely expected to owe some positive
amount after audit. After experiencing an audit outcome of owing
nothing (or even receiving a refund), that taxpayer should be
expected to revise that expectation downward. Thus, “[a]ccording
to the rational taxpayer model, on average the effect on future
reported income should be lower than in the positive-adjustment
case.”369 That is, if deterrence works, an audited taxpayer who is
found to owe more tax should be more deterred from noncompliance than an audited taxpayer who is found to owe nothing.
Note that the focus here is on specific deterrence—that is, the
effect on the audited taxpayer. The regime-level effect of audit rates
is the focus of many studies, and many studies do not separate out
the effects on those actually experiencing an enforcement action.370
But for a taxpayer who actually experiences an audit, if the audit
results in no additional tax (let alone a penalty), it is intuitive that
that reduces the deterrent effect of audits to that taxpayer (that is, the
specific-deterrent effect), at least for some period of time.
This analysis reflects a learning effect—at a minimum learning
from the audit outcome. It may also reflect learning from the audit
experience ways in which noncompliance was effective or likely
would not be detected.371 As Kleven et al. noted, audits provide
information to taxpayers, particularly with respect to the perceived
likelihood of detection.372
In addition, taxpayers who were audited and found not to owe
more tax may infer that the likelihood of audit for the next few
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.

Id. at 23.
Id. at 6.
Id.
See supra notes 61, 68, and 219 (pointing this out).
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 181, at 69–70 (“This newfound awareness
of opportunities for reporting and paying lower taxes combined with a low perceived future
audit risk could drive some taxpayers to report less income on subsequent returns.”); cf.
Mazzolini et al., supra note 215, at 24 (“[I]n the case of cheating taxpayers, we expect a
downward revision of the perceived probability that tax inspectors are successful in
discovering evasion.”).
372. Kleven et al., supra note 126, at 681; see also Gemmell & Ratto, supra note 325, at 55.
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years is low.373 Endogenous audits—where audit selection is not
random—suggest a decreased likelihood of a quick second audit of
a taxpayer who was found compliant, leading to a seemingly “safe”
period for noncompliance.374 In theory, that should not be true for
random audits, but people may misperceive the likelihood of a
random event recurring.375 In other words, after an audit where the
taxpayer was found compliant, the taxpayer may reduce the
perceived likelihood of an audit for the next few years, reducing the
perceived probability of detection. Under the deterrence model,
this could reduce the taxpayer’s expected cost of evasion.376
Note that the explanations regarding learning and a “safe
period” do not need to disaggregate the subgroup of audited nochange taxpayers into those who were actually compliant and those
who were in fact noncompliant but simply did not get caught. It is
possible that any of the taxpayers in this subgroup expect that the
likelihood of audit in the future is low (whether they were actually
compliant or not).377 It also is possible that any of these taxpayers
learned from the audit a “safe” method of cheating, although this
likely is most true of taxpayers who were actually noncompliant, in
that they directly observed noncompliance going undetected.
The NTA offered three possible explanations for her finding
that audited taxpayers who were not found to owe more tax
reduced their subsequent tax payments. One combines the “safe

373. Mazzolini et al., supra note 215, at 23–24 (“[T]he taxpayer . . . [may] think[] that,
after a null-outcome [(no-change)] audit, she is removed, for some time at least, from the set
of taxpayers targeted by the [tax agency].”); NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 181, at
70 (referring to a “low perceived future audit risk”).
374. This approach is supported by the pattern observed by Kastlunger et al. in their
first lab experiment: “The behavior of the participants . . . reminds [sic] of a ‘cops and
robbers’ situation. When participants expected audits, they were compliant and, to a great
extent, they evaded when they felt ‘safe.’” Kastlunger et al., supra note 281, at 413
(citation omitted).
375. This concept underlies the term “bomb-crater effect” and is similar to the belief
that lightning doesn’t strike twice in the same place. See supra note 269.
376. See supra text accompanying notes 103–104.
377. Mazzolini et al., supra note 215, at 23 (“A null-outcome [(no-change)] audit may
occur either if the taxpayer was actually compliant and AE [(Agenzia delle Entrate, the Italian
tax agency)] acknowledges this or if the taxpayer evaded taxes and AE was not able to
uncover evasion. In either case, the taxpayer has no reason to increase her subsequent income
reports . . . .”); NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 181, at 70 (referring to a “low
perceived future audit risk”).

685

003.LEDERMAN_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/17/19 7:43 PM

2018

period” and “safe methods” hypotheses described above.378
Another one focuses on (presumably) compliant taxpayers and
hypothesizes that they experienced a reduction in tax morale.379
This might be termed the “crowding-out hypothesis,” as it focuses
primarily on compliant taxpayers and suggests that extrinsic
enforcement crowded out intrinsic motivations (a crowding-out
effect). The third explanation is that cheaters were emboldened by
not having been caught on audit.380
Of course, there may have been a mix of fully compliant
taxpayers and noncompliant taxpayers. A field experiment such as
this one cannot distinguish between actual compliance and
noncompliance that was not detected on audit because the auditors
do not know the actual amount of tax due. In this respect,
laboratory experiments are particularly helpful because the experimenter perceives actual compliance levels. While Maciejovsky et al.
found no difference in the post-audit compliance rates of those
compliant or noncompliant in the audit round,381 the results of the
Kastlunger et al. lab experiment testing repeated audits, discussed
above,382 could suggest that taxpayers who were actually compliant
when audited tend to decrease their compliance post-audit.
However, that study involved audits at predetermined times,
rather than audit selection based on the taxpayer’s likelihood of
evasion. Satterthwaite’s data, by contrast, found a lower compliance rate in the round after audit by the noncompliant than by
the fully compliant.383

378. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 181, at 70.
379. Id. at 69 (“[A]n experience of coercive enforcement activity could reduce tax

morale among (seemingly) compliant taxpayers . . . .”).
380. Id. at 69–70 (“[T]he observed reduction in reported income may be attributable to
noncompliant taxpayers whose misreporting was not detected during the audit.
Experiencing an audit that results in no recommended additional tax assessment may
embolden such taxpayers to become even more noncompliant in the future.”).
381. Maciejovsky et al., supra note 244, at 688; see also supra text accompanying notes
271–273 (summarizing this study).
382. See Kastlunger et al., supra note 281, at 409, 412 tbl.3.
383. That was true in both the random audit and endogenous audit conditions, but the
compliance rates in both the audit round and the next round were higher in the endogenous
audit condition. See Attachment to Email from Emily Satterthwaite, Professor, Univ. of
Toronto, to author (May 12, 2016) (on file with author). The details are as follows:
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Given the fact that the overall misreporting percentage for the
group of taxpayers involved in the NTA’s study (self-employed
taxpayers) is much higher than average,384 it seems likely that at
least some of the taxpayers labelled compliant were actually
noncompliant.385 In addition, the fact that the majority of taxpayers
audited by the IRS, at least according to the DeBacker study,386 are
found compliant supports that idea, assuming that the IRS’s
selection criteria are at all effective. To the extent that some of the
taxpayers whose returns were not adjusted to owe more tax were
actually noncompliant, failing to detect that noncompliance means
that the audit not only left money on the table for that tax year, it
may have emboldened these taxpayers to increase their evasion in
subsequent years.387
Note that there is another possible category of taxpayers in this
subgroup, which the three explanations the NTA offers do not
address: overcompliers. In the NTA’s study, all taxpayers with no
“additional recommended tax assessment” were grouped
together.388 Taxpayers who correctly received a refund are

Compliance in Round t1
Audited in round t0
& found compliant

Audited in round t0
& found noncompliant

Random audit

0.820 (n=340)

0.400 (n=290)

Endogenous audit

0.915 (n=421)

0.805 (n=114)

Id.
384. Income subject to no information reporting has an estimated compliance rate of
only 37%, compared to an average rate of almost 82% and a high of 99% for income subject
to both withholding and substantial information reporting. See INTERNAL REVENUE SVC.,
supra note 113, at 3; supra text accompanying note 113; supra text accompanying notes 129–
130. Self-employed taxpayers have a high opportunity to evade taxes. Mazzolini et al., supra
note 215, at 10.
385. Cf. Morse et al., supra note 126, at 37 (“According to government reports, most
individuals with business income fail to pay all their taxes, although some appear to cheat
more than others.”); id. at 67 (concluding that “[c]ash business owners rely on parallel cash
economies to underreport receipts and thereby evade income, employment and sales taxes”).
386. See supra note 339. The Gemmell and Ratto study found a supermajority compliant.
See supra note 328. However, that was in random audits. See supra text accompanying
note 326.
387. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 181, at 91.
388. See supra note 352. The Italian study by Mazzolini et al. does not mention the
possibility of taxpayers receiving a refund. See Mazzolini et al., supra note 215, at 9, 48 fig.1
(audit outcomes).
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overcompliers. Overcompliant taxpayers are situated differently
from others in that a reduction from overcompliance does not
necessarily produce undercompliance. Moreover, those taxpayers’
motivations may be different, so disaggregating taxpayers found
overcompliant would be helpful. The DeBacker et al. study, which
is also of IRS audits and for a similar time period, though not
limited to self-employed taxpayers,389 observed a different postaudit pattern between audited taxpayers who experienced no
adjustment and taxpayers who received a negative adjustment
(refund). While the reported taxable income of the former declined
one year post-audit, then increased for the next few years, the
reported taxable income of the latter group increased in the first
year after audit and then generally zigzagged.390
The NTA’s second proposed explanation, that the audit may
have reduced tax morale, crowding out intrinsic motivation to pay
taxes, deserves detailed examination.391 The report does not explain
why an audit might reduce compliant taxpayers’ intrinsic motivation. One could posit that a compliant taxpayer who is audited
may feel like a “chump” for complying.392 That is, a compliant
taxpayer may feel penalized despite (or for) doing the right thing
or may begin to feel that the government is hapless—wasting
resources auditing the compliant.393
389. The NTA studied the effect of audits of the 2007 tax year. See supra note 347 and
accompanying text. DeBacker et al. studied the IRS’s random (research) audits of the 2006
through 2009 years. See supra text accompanying notes 337–338.
390. See DeBacker et al., supra note 337, at 45 fig.4; see also supra note 345 (reporting
the numbers).
391. The crowding-out hypothesis focuses on taxpayers who have intrinsic motivations
to comply and were actually compliant in the audit year. Field experiments cannot readily
distinguish between true and faked compliance, but laboratory experiments can. A lab
experiment could examine the effect of an audit (whether random or endogenous) that labels
some participants’ reports “compliant” even when they are not, to see the extent to which
that has the effect of reducing subsequent compliance (as the deterrence model would
predict), or whether only audits of truly compliant participants have that effect (as the
crowding-out theory would predict).
392. See Lederman, supra note 70, at 1497–98 (“[S]anctioning people who do not
contribute to public goods can reassure others that they will not be ‘chumps’ if
they contribute.”).
393. Deterrence can remove that feeling—as long as it is applied to the noncompliant.
See id. Thus, this hypothesis would not be inconsistent with the fact that audit threats have
been found to increase compliance. See supra Part I.B.1. Audit threats differ from actual audits
in that a compliant taxpayer could interpret an audit threat to mean that noncompliant
taxpayers will be investigated and burdened. The actual audit is a burden even to a
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However, a follow-up study on taxpayer attitudes commissioned by the NTA394 found that “audited self-employed taxpayers
perceive higher degrees of procedural justice, information justice,
interpersonal justice, and distributive justice than the unaudited
control group.”395 In addition, audited taxpayers who were not
found to owe more tax reported higher levels on all four categories
of justice (procedural, informational, interpersonal, and distributive) than audited taxpayers who had a positive tax adjustment.396
The same was true of those taxpayers who received a refund.397
Although these were not the same self-employed taxpayers as in
the earlier study,398 the survey results suggest that the audit
experience did not produce negative feelings for self-employed
taxpayers who were found not to owe more tax, undermining the
crowding-out hypothesis.
Moreover, a tax-morale explanation is not needed to explain a
post-audit decline in tax payments by taxpayers found not to owe
more tax, once the effect on specific deterrence of a no-change audit
is considered.399 That is, the absence of a penalty or even tax due is
not much of a deterrent because it likely reduces the perceived
sanction. This in itself would reduce deterrence under the

compliant taxpayer because of the time and stress involved, as well as possible financial costs
of engaging tax advisors. A study in Austria suggests that too much audit supervision can
backfire by delaying payments. See Katharina Gangl et al., Effects of Supervision on Tax
Compliance: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Austria, 123 ECON. LETTERS 378, 379–80 (2014)
(explaining that intervention involving tax authority visits to new firms plus monthly audits
during the firm’s first year statistically significantly decreased timely payment, but for firms
paying late, supervision reduced taxes due by an estimated 27 to 50%).
394. The study was conducted by Matthias Kasper, Sebastian Beer, Erich Kirchler, and
Brian Erard. MATTHIAS KASPER ET AL., NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE & TAXPAYER ADVOCATE
SERV., Audits, Identity Theft Investigations, and Taxpayer Attitudes: Evidence from a National
Survey, in 2 TAS RESEARCH AND RELATED STUDIES 148 (2017), https://taxpayeradvocate.irs
.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2017-ARC/ARC17_Volume2_05_AuditsIDtp.pdf.
395. Id. at 163.
396. Id. at 166 fig.5.8; see also id. at 180 app. A (relevant questions and numerical scale).
397. Id.
398. The study included “2,729 self-employed taxpayers (1,363 audited and 1,366 nonaudited) . . . .” Id. at 159. Among other selection criteria, the audited taxpayers “[h]ad an
operational audit between tax years 2010 and 2015.” Id. at 158. (The earlier study compared
a “random sample of 2,204 Schedule C filers . . . who were audited subsequent to filing their
TY 2007 returns with data for a control sample of 4,705 who were not audited.” NAT’L
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 181, at 71.)
399. See supra text accompanying notes 361–365.
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deterrence model,400 but the effect is compounded when it is
combined with the “safe period” notion discussed above; a
taxpayer who was audited and not found to owe more tax might
very well reduce the perceived likelihood of audit in the
near future.401
It is also worth noting that some compliant taxpayers’
subsequent evasion may be regression to the mean.402 That is, an
audit is a snapshot of one particular year. Such a snapshot may not
entirely capture a taxpayer’s behavior over time. For example, a
taxpayer may report 90% of income, on average, but report somewhat more in some years—perhaps even 100%—and somewhat
less in others. In general, at the extreme ends of the distribution, the
taxpayer’s subsequent behavior is most likely to move closer to the
mean. And taxpayers audited and found fully compliant approach
one extreme on the distribution of audit results.403
A 1988 study conducted by Hessing et al. on Dutch individuals’
tax returns supports this idea.404 Although a number of the details
in the brief report of the study are not fully clear,405 the article
explains that the Dutch tax authorities checked every tax return
every year and simply corrected inaccurate returns,406 without
imposing a penalty.407 Hessing et al. generally found that
noncompliance in one year predicts noncompliance in a future

400. See supra text accompanying notes 103–104.
401. See supra text accompanying notes 373–374.
402. This effect is easier to isolate with a matched group of unaudited fully compliant

taxpayers, which the U.K. and U.S. studies did not have. However, those studies did use
statistical techniques to control for the fact that the subgroups of audited compliant and
audited noncompliant are not randomly assigned. See supra note 329 (U.K. Gemmell and
Ratto study); supra note 350 (NTA’s U.S. study).
403. See Long, supra note 319, at 118.
404. See Hessing et al., supra note 112, at 298–304.
405. See Richard Bird, Commentary on Dick J. Hessing et al., Does Deterrence Deter?
Measuring the Effect of Deterrence on Tax Compliance in Field Studies and Experimental
Studies, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 306, 309 (Joel
Slemrod ed., 1992) (“[W]ith respect to the second field study reported by the authors,
unfortunately once again some crucial pieces of information are missing from the highly
condensed account.”); see also infra note 408.
406. Hessing et al., supra note 112, at 298.
407. The article explains that the tax authority imposed no penalty unless, after the
return had been processed, subsequent information that was not available upon initial
inspection indicated tax evasion. In that case, the tax authority could impose a penalty of 25
to 100% of the evaded taxes. Id.
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year.408 Interestingly, the taxpayers whose prior returns were not
corrected—and thus presumably were found largely compliant by
the Dutch tax authorities—were found to have in 1986 a
noncompliance percentage of about 11% and an evasion percentage
of about 3%.409 Yet these taxpayers apparently did not experience
any contact from the tax authority.410 Accordingly, it would seem
that the reduced compliance by those taxpayers had nothing to do
with an audit. Thus, this study also lends at least limited support to
the idea that some taxpayers who are found fully compliant in one
year may not be the next year, regardless of whether they
are audited.
Gemmell and Ratto’s U.K. study examined whether having no
adjustment at all on audit was the key to the result. The authors
looked at whether taxpayers with a small adjustment behaved
similarly to taxpayers with no adjustment.411 They found limited
support for that notion, but the results were not statistically
significant.412 Thus, that inquiry does not help resolve the question
of how much of the post-audit effect is specific to fully
compliant taxpayers.
Overall, the results of the studies on self-employed or small
business taxpayers in the United Kingdom, United States, and Italy
suggest that while undergoing an audit generally increases
subsequent tax payments, it does not do so for taxpayers found not
to owe additional tax. In fact, taxpayers in that subgroup may

408. See id. at 302, 303 fig.2 (also finding that result for tax evasion). Based on the figure,
the percentages of noncompliance for 1986 in the three groups seem to be about 11%
(presumably of Dutch Guilders) for taxpayers whose prior returns had not been corrected,
28% for taxpayers whose returns had contained errors that were corrected, and 36% for
taxpayers whose prior returns were corrected for tax evasion. The exact numbers are not
given, and there appears to be a typo on the y-axis, such that 0% should be 10%. Also, the
discussion and figure are not clear as to which prior year(s) are being compared. See id.
409. Id. at 303 fig.2.
410. Hessing et al. describe the process as follows:
In the Dutch tax system, every single tax form is checked every year. . . .
When a tax form is found to be incorrect, the tax inspector simply corrects the tax
form and collects the tax associated . . . . If the (positive) correction takes place
during the normal processing of the tax form, there is no possibility of
administering a fine.
Id. at 298.
411. Gemmell & Ratto, supra note 325, at 50.
412. Id. at 52.
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reduce their tax payments. While one could argue that the audit
experience crowded out intrinsic motivations to pay tax, there is
little evidence to support that argument. Rather, the result is
consistent with the deterrence model: a positive outcome is not
much of a deterrent.
CONCLUSION
Given the importance to the government of tax compliance, it is
important to know whether and when deterrence works. Some
have suggested that audits or audit threats may backfire.413
However, not only has an IRS researcher found in a detailed study
that audits increase tax compliance,414 empirical studies generally
find that enforcement fosters compliance.415 In part, that may be
because failing to pursue back taxes simply allows taxpayers to
ignore the delinquency.416 In addition, enforcement may signal not
that many taxpayers are evading taxes but rather that few taxpayers
successfully evade.417 In fact, it is non-enforcement that “sends a
signal . . . that others do not wish to enforce the tax laws and that
tax evasion is in some sense socially acceptable, and the social norm

413. See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 3, at 380–81 (“When the IRS engages in dramatic
gestures to make individuals aware that it is redoubling its efforts to catch and punish tax
evaders, it also causes individuals to infer that more taxpayers than they thought are
choosing to cheat. This inference in turn triggers a reciprocal motive to evade, which
dominates the greater material incentive to comply associated with the higher than expected
penalty.” (footnotes omitted)); Mendoza et al., supra note 220 (finding a correlation between
a higher audit rate in a country and a higher perceived rate of tax evasion); cf. Frey, supra
note 50, at 387 (reporting that pooled data for Switzerland finds that a higher probability of
detection correlates with higher tax evasion).
414. See Plumley, supra note 155.
415. See supra Part II.B.
416. See Ryan Briggs, How to Fix Philly’s Poor Tax Collection, PHILLY.COM (July 2, 2015)
(connecting high delinquency rates in Philadelphia property taxes and business taxes to lack
of enforcement and difficulties in making payment, and adding, “The city’s liquor tax, hotel
tax and school income tax . . . similarly rely on self-reporting, and often go uncollected with
few warnings or penalties.”); see also Chirico et al., supra note 163, at 138 (explaining,
regarding Philadelphia’s property tax, “In the past, the [Department of Revenue’s] efforts at
collection from these very tardy taxpayers have been limited to simply remailing the usual
reminder letter.”).
417. See Lederman, supra note 70, at 1497–98; see also Davis et al., supra note 239.
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of compliance disappears. Such an outcome is common in many
countries, such as the Philippines and Italy . . . .”418
The notion that deterrence, perversely, will reduce tax
compliance generally is not consistent with the ample empirical
evidence in the United States and elsewhere. For example, the IRS
finds a positive “shadow” effect on tax collections from each dollar
collected via enforcement,419 and field studies generally find
positive effects of audit threats and of audits with prior notice.420
Several field studies have found evidence in the context of
unincorporated small business taxpayers of a reduction in reported
tax liabilities following an audit that did not yield additional tax
due. This suggests that audits that do not result in a tax payment
have an opportunity cost not only with respect to that tax year but
also with respect to several subsequent years for that taxpayer. This
outcome, while perhaps initially surprising, is consistent with the
deterrence model; a favorable outcome after audit may lower that
taxpayer’s perceived likelihood of subsequent audit and the
perceived magnitude of the sanction.
In addition, it is important to remember that the overall direct
effect of audits is increased tax payments by those audited, and the
positive indirect effect of audits has been estimated to be much
larger than the direct positive effect of audits. Thus, it would be
unwise to conclude that reduced enforcement would have a
positive effect on compliance. In fact, at low audit rates such as
those in the United States, the evidence suggests that increasing the
audit rate would increase overall tax compliance.

418. James Alm & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Institutions, Paradigms, and Tax Evasion in
Developing and Transition Countries, in PUBLIC FINANCE IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL
COUNTRIES 146, 151 (Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & James Alm eds., 2003).
419. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
420. See supra Part II.B.1.
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